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American public law entrusts judges with considerable power to review the decisions
of other government actors. While judicial review sometimes involves only abstract
questions of law, more often it entails implicit or explicit evaluation of a government
decision-maker’s empirical or predictive judgments. Yet most judges are generalist
lawyers with minimal experience in scientific, economic, or policy analysis. The
government actorswhose decisions are reviewed , on the other hand, are often thought to
have considerable expertise in such matters. This creates a dilemmafor reviewing courts
and raises a more general puzzle regarding the design of American public law
institutions. The dilemma for courts is that judges do not want to abdicate their
responsibility or their power to constrain other government officials, but they are
reluctant to second-guess the choices of more expert decision-makers, especially when
complex or technical issues are involved. The institutional design puzzle is how one
might account for pervasive review of expert decisions by non-expert courts, and whether
mechanisms have emerged to address the difficulties inherent in this sort of arrangement.
One judicial response to the dilemma just described is to require that the government
provide a satisfactoryexplan ation for its proposed action, often in the form of a written
record or statement. Proponents of this approach, which is sometimes referred to as
“hard look” review,1 contend that judicial scrutiny of government explanations can
reconcile the perceived need for expert decision-making and the perceived need for a
judicial check. This proposed reconciliation, however, is problematic. The same lack of
expertise that makes it hard for a generalist court to evaluate a government decision on
the merits also makes it hard for the court to assess the coherence, accuracy, and
methodological soundness of the government’s explanation for its action. Critics of hard
look review have also raised serious questions about whether the kind of lawyerly
rationality demanded by reviewing courts has any particularly strong connection to
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1
The term “hard look” review was coined by Judge Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit. See Pikes
Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). As originally formulated by Judge Leventhal, the term “hard
look” review referred to the idea that reviewing courts are supposed to ensure that the agency has taken a
“hard look” at salient aspects of the decision problem. Over time, however, the phrase has come to connote
the idea that courts are supposed to take a “hard look” at the agency’s decision process. See National Lime
Assoc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n. 126 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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substantively rational policy- making. Therefore, in those cases where it is difficult or
impossible for courts to assess the substance of the government’s explanation for its
decision, it is not always clear what hard look review accomplishes, and some have
suggested that it amounts to little more than meaningless theater.
The thesis of this Article is that judicially-imposed explanation requirements can help
reviewing courts overcome their comparative informational disadvantage for reasons that
are independent of the (in)ability of courts to understand or verify the substantive content
of the justifications advanced by government decision-makers. The argument is based on
two key assumptions. The first is that the expected benefit of a proposed policy from the
reviewing court’s perspective is positively correlated with the benefit of that policy to the
government. The second assumption is that the court can use the quality of the
government’s explanation – where “quality” as used here is a shorthand for what one
might think of as the more superficial aspects of quality (polish, thoroughness, detail,
complexity, raw length) – as a rough proxy for the costs the government incurred in
producing this explanation. If these assumptions hold, then the court can reason that the
expert government decision-maker’s willingness to “burn money” by investing time and
energy to produce a high-quality explanation signals that the government believes the
benefits of the proposed policy are high; because the preferences of the court and the
government are positively correlated in expectation, the fact that the government places a
high value on the policy in question means the policy is more likely to be acceptable from
the court’s perspective. Therefore, judicial evaluation of the quality of the government’s
explanation ameliorates the court’s informational disadvantage, even when the court is
incapable of assessing the methodological soundness or analytical coherence of the
content of this explanation.2
2

This argument is similar to the hypothesis advanced in the economics literature that the primary
function of much corporate advertising is not to convey factual information about a product, but rather to
signal a firm’s willingness to spend money on advertising. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and
Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986); Phillip Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970); Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 81 J. POL.
ECON. 729 (1974). In many cases, a high level of spending on advertising can only be recouped if
customers purchase the product repeatedly. Therefore, spending on advertising signals the firm’s
confidence that consumers who purchase the product once will become repeat customers. Other formal
models use a similar “burning money” argument in different contexts. See David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey
S. Banks, Cheap Talk and Burned Money, 91 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (2000); B. Douglas Bernheim & Lee
Redding, Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividend Policy, 10 J. ECON. &
MGMT STRATEGY 463 (2001); Hans Gersbach, The Money-Burning Refinement: With an Application to a
Political Signaling Game, 33 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 67 (2004); Edward M. Iacobucci, Toward a Signaling
Explanation of the Private Choice of Corporate Law, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 319 (2004). Some legal
scholars have suggested applications of this type of model that are similar to the argument developed in this
Article. See Eric Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory
Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1160-61 (2001) (suggesting that an expensive but uninformative
cost-benefit analysis may be a way for a regulating agency to signal to the reviewing President that
proposed regulation has a high value); Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative
Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1343, 1369 (2002) (suggesting that
lobbying by regulatory targets can signal their compliance costs); id. at 1377 (suggesting that a requirement
that agencies conduct costly regulatory analyses screens out low-value regulations); Emerson H. Tiller,
Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150
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This hypothesis provides an alternative perspective on the institutional relationship
between generalist reviewing courts and expert government decision-makers. While
signaling may not be the sole or even the primary function of judicially-imposed
explanation requirements, understanding hard look review in signaling terms may help
explain some of the more puzzling aspects of this sort of review and suggest additional
positive hypotheses about how hard look review operates in practice. More generally,
this Article suggests the importance of paying more attention to subtle and indirect
institutional mechanisms that the American legal system has developed to mitigate
informational asymmetries and to preserve meaningful checks and balances. Costly
signaling through the quality of the government’s formal explanation and justification for
its decisions may be one such mechanism. There are almost certainly others, and
identifying and analyzing them is important to understanding the structure of American
public
This
lawArticle
inst itutions.
develops the costly signaling explanation for hard look review, using
judicial review of administrative agency regulations as a paradigm case. Part I explains
the basic logic of the theory, derives behavioral predictions, and considers important
objections. Part II extends the analysis to incorporate the possibility that government
actors may not always have better information than the courts. Part III considers
potential applications of the theory to aspects of constitutional law and criminal
procedure. The Article also includes an Appendix that models formally the str ategic
interactions that are discussed qualitatively in Parts I and II.
I. THE COSTLY SIGNALING THEORY OF HARD LOOK REVIEW
A. Hard Look Review of Agency Regulations
The costly signaling theory of hard look review has applications to a range of public
law contexts in which generalist courts review the decisions of expert government
decision-makers. To sharpen the discussion and clarify the logic of the argument, it is
helpful to focus on what may be the paradigm case of generalist judicial review of expert
government decision-making: judicial review of agency regulations under §706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA
) and/or the more specific review provisions
contained in particular statutes. The delegation of substantial quasi-legislative power to
administrative agencies is often justified in terms of agencies’ superior expertise and
insulation from the undesirable effects of legislative politics.3 Precisely these
characteristics of administrative agencies, however, raise the specter of arbitrary rule by
unelected technocrats.4 That fear may be exaggerated, as agencies are subject to some

U. PENN. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2002) (noting that the “essence of [hard look review] is to attack the
reasoning process of the regulator and force it to spend more of its resources (whether through more
extensive studies or more detailed reasoning of policy choices) to achieve its desired policy objective”).
3
See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A
Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000).
4
See THEODORE S. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
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degree of political control by both the President and Congress.5 Nonetheless, concerns
about unchecked administrative governance have given rise to a system in which, as
Louis Jaffe famously insisted, judicial review of administrative action “is the necessary
condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which
purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”6
The tension between the judiciary’s interest in constraining the exercise of
administrative power and its awareness of the limits of its institutional competence is
apparent in the leading cases on the appropriate standard of review to apply when courts
inquire, pursuant to the APA, whether an agency’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.”7 Reviewing courts could have interpreted their mandate to strike
down “arbitrary” agency action as a license to evaluate agency regulations on the merits,
but doing so would have raised problems not only of institutional legitimacy but of
institutional competence. Courts also might have interpreted the arbitrary and capricious
standard as authorizing reversal only of those agency actions so obviously lunatic that no
reasonable person could have adopted them. This, though, would render trivial any
judicial check on agency policy-making. The courts have instead charted a different
course, shifting the emphasis of review under §706 and analogous provisions away from
a substantive assessment of the government’s decision and toward an evaluation of the
government’s explanation of the reasoning and analysis underlying that decision.8 So,
while the Supreme Court has instructed that a reviewing court must not “substitute its
judgment for that of the agency,”9 it has also instructed that the reviewing court conduct a
“searching and careful” inquiry into “whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
5

On presidential control of the administration, see, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994); Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional
Dominance’, 12 LEG. STUD. Q. 475 (1987). On congressional oversight, see, e.g., JOEL D. ABERBACH,
KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE (1990); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 481 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J.
Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
6
LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965).
7
5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A).
8
See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 383
(1986); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 409-28
(1981); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 276-79 (1987); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 527 (1997) [herinafter
Ossification]; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1400, 1410-11 (1992) [herinafter Deossifying]; Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active
Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 629 (1997); Martin
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 477 (1986);.Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E.
Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 411-13, 419-25.
9
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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judgment.”10 To satisfy this requirement, the agency must demonstrate that it has
“examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action,
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”11 A
similar type of approach – that is, an emphasis on the adequacy of the record and the
quality of the agency’s explanation – is evident in judicial review of administrative action
in other doctrinal contexts as well,12 and may also occur in cases of non-judicial review
of agency action, e.g. review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).13
Though there is considerable variation in how courts apply the hard look standard in
practice, the general pattern involves a preliminary statement by the court that the judicial
role is limited to assessing whether the agency acted reasonably, followed by some
degree of judicial scrutiny, at the behest of the aggrieved parties, of the agency’s
evidence and arguments in favor of its more controversial conclusions. More often than
not, significant agency regulations survive hard look review,14 but in many of these cases
the reviewing court reaches this conclusion only after an extended discussion and
assessment of the agency’s defense of its action. In Sierra Club v. Costle, for example,
the D.C. Circuit considered multiple challenges to an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) rule establishing New Source Performance Standards for coal-fired power plants.15
The court upheld the rule, but only after issuing a 110-page opinion, approximately 45
pages of were devoted specifically to considering EPA’s record evidence and arguments
in favor of its approach.16 Judge Wald’s opinion for the court emphasized in conclusion
that the court had “read the record with as hard a look as mortal judges can probably give
its thousands of pages” and had “probed the agency’s rationale, studied its references …
[and] endeavored to understand them….”17 A similar approach is evident in United
10

Overton Park, 401 U.S., at 416.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
For example, though hard look review normally refers to judicial inquiry into whether an agency’s
action is arbitrary and capricious, courts sometimes engage in a functionally equivalent sort of review in the
context of assessing whether the agency has provided a satisfactory “statement of [] basis and purpose,” 5
U.S.C. §553(c). See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (1977).
Also, courts sometimes engage in this kind of review when deciding whether an agency’s decision is based
on “substantial evidence.” See infra notes 18, 51.
13
One might argue that OMB review is dissimilar to judicial review because OMB’s reviewers are
experts, if not in the scientific and substance-specific aspects of regulation, then at least in the techniques of
cost-benefit analysis. Though there may be some truth to this, there reason to suspect that OMB review
faces at least some of the same difficulties as reviewing courts. OMB has a relatively small staff,
especially given the size and difficulty of its mandate, and the agencies it reviews have considerable
advantages in terms of staff and resources. See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory
Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1276-66 (1987). For applications of a related set of arguments specifically
in the context of presidential review of administrative action, see Posner, supra note 2, at 1160-61.
14
See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94
NW. L. REV. 393, 395-98 (2000); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Mid-Passage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 Tulsa L.J. 221, 233 n.70 (1996).
15
657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
16
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 322-39, 347-51, 360-73, 377-83.
17
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 410.
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Steelworkers v. Marshall, in which the D.C. Circuit upheld the conclusion of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that a permissible exposure limit
(PEL) for lead of 50 micrograms per cubic meter was reasonably necessary to prevent a
significant and material risk to human health.18 The court explained that its obligation
was to “examine the sequence of reasoning that led OSHA” to adopt this specific PEL19
and to ensure that OSHA’s factual conclusions were “supported by substantial
evidence.”20 After noting that OSHA had provided “extremely detailed summaries and
explanations of the evidence”21 and providing an extended 16 page discussion of the
disputes related to this evidence, the court held that OSHA’s finding was adequately
supported.22 In these and other cases, reviewing courts have upheld agency action under
some variant of the hard look approach, but only after the agency has provided a lengthy
discussion and analysis of the key issues.
In a few high-profile cases, the court conducting hard look review has found an
agency’s explanation deficient. In these cases, the court often indicates what the agency
would need to do – usually more or more elaborate research or analysis – in order to
satisfy the hard look standard. In one well-known example, Corrosion Proof Fittings v.
EPA, the Fifth Circuit vacated an EPA rule banning the manufacture and distribution of
asbestos products.23 The court held that EPA had failed to meet its burden under the
Toxic Substances Control Act of demonstrating that a ban was the “least burdensome”
way to prevent an “unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”24 The Fifth
18

647 F.2d 1189, 1244-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court reviewed OSHA’s decision under a “substantial
evidence” standard than the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in §706(A)(2) of the APA because
the Occupational Safety and Health Act specifically provides that the OSHA’s determinations “shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole,” 29 U.S.C. §655(f). This
standard, like the arbitrary and capricious standard, has been treated by courts as calling for a “hard look”
at the agency’s decision. See, e.g., Building & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (stating that the role of a court reviewing an OSHA regulation under the §655(f) standard is “not
to decide what assumptions or findings we would make were we in the Secretary’s position,” but instead to
“scrutinize the record to ensure that the Secretary has made his findings of fact on the basis of substantial
evidence and has provided a reasoned explanation for his policy assumptions and conclusions”; see also
United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1207. Some courts have argued that the §655(f) standard, though
deferential, calls for a “harder look” than typical arbitrary and capricious review. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA,
965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992); Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984). For
pu
r poses of the analysis in this Article, there is no meaningful difference between the standard of review
mandated by the APA and the substantial evidence standard mandated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, given the similarity of the judicial approach in both doctrinal contexts.
19
United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1244-45.
20
Id. at at 1253.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 1248-63. Although the United Steelworkers court upheld most aspects of OSHA’s lead rule,
including the selection of the PEL, the court did find that there was not sufficient evidence in the record to
support OSHA’s determination that the standard was technically and economically feasible for certain
industries. Id. at 1278-1308. OSHA addressed this problem in regulations announced in subsequent
rulemaking proceedings, most but not all of which were upheld on hard look review. See Amer. Iron &
Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
23
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
24
Id. at 1214-29. Like the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) imposes a substantial evidence standard of review in lieu of the otherwise applicable “arbitrary and
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Circuit not only found that EPA had failed adequately to consider alternatives, but it also
expressed “concern[s] about some of the methodology employed by EPA” and indicated
that, if EPA wanted to re-enact its asbestos ban, it would need to provide a more extended
discussion of factors like appropriate discounting, substitute products, unquantified
benefits, and exposure estimates.25 More generally, the court described the EPA’s
consideration of the economic costs of its proposed regulation as “cavalier” and its
consideration of undesirable side effects as “cursory.”26 In another widely-discussed
case, AFL-CIO v. OSHA, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated an OSHA rule that attempted to
set PELs for 428 workplace air contaminants.27 The Eleventh Circuit held that OSHA
had failed to fulfill its responsibility “to quantify or explain, at least to some reasonable
degree, the risk posed by each toxic substance regulated.”28 For most of these
substances, the court complained, OSHA had merely “cited a few studies and then
established a PEL without explaining why the studies mandated the particular PEL
chosen.”29 Though the court acknowledged that OSHA’s resource constraints made it
impossible for the agency to “go[] through a detailed analysis for each of the 428
different substances regulated,” the court insisted that this sort of analysis was required
by the statute.30
Defenders of this sort of hard look review, including the courts that carry it out, argue
that it ensures the supposedly expert agency really has based its decision on a reasoned
analysis of relevant information.31 Sometimes this claim is framed in terms of the
efficacy of hard look review in correcting specific decision-making biases and

capricious” standard contained in the APA. 15 U.S.C. §2618(c)(1)(B)(i). See also Corrosion Proof
Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1213-14 (noting that the TSCA’s substantial evidence standard is more stringent than
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard). That said, the basic analytical framework applied under the
TSCA’s substantial evidence standard parallels the hard look approach used for review under APA §706.
See id. at 1214 (stating that agency must “cogently explain why it ahs exercised its discretion in a given
matter and must offer a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”) (citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
25
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218-22.
26
Id. at 1223-24.
27
965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
28
Id. at 975 (emphasis in original).
29
Id. at 976.
30
Id. at 987.
31
See Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of Certainty on Appeal, 44 DUKE
L.J. 1081, 1100 (1995); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J.
38, 59-60 (1975); Sargentich, supra note 8, at 631; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 483, 514, 521 (1997); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy
in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1077 (1995); Shapiro & Levy,
supra note 8, at 430; Cass Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Administrative
Law, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 53 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Defense]; Cass Sunstein, On the
Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 527-29
(hereinafter Costs and Benefits); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review of Complex Administrative Agency
Decisions, 462 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 77 (1982).
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pathologies to which agencies are thought to be vulnerable.32 Sometimes the claim is
framed as a more general argument that hard look review encourages agencies to engage
in a superior (e.g., more comprehensively rational, more deliberative) decision-making
process.33 So, for example, although Professor Cass Sunstein observed that the Fifth
Circuit’s aggressive evaluation of the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis in Corrosion Proof
Fittings “went far beyond what the statute unambiguously invited”34 and erred in some
respects,35 Professor Sunstein nonetheless concluded that the Corrosion Proof Fittings
approach was desirable in that it prevented EPA from basing a regulation on unjustified
assumptions.36 More generally, proponents of hard look review claim that the approach
taken by the D.C. Circuit in cases like Sierra Club and United Steelworkers – adopting a
deferential posture but requiring the agency to supply a detailed and well-reasoned
analysis of the scientific basis for its regulation – has a positive effect on regulatory
quality. The argument presumes – sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly – that the
hard look review of the agency’s record of decision and statement of basis and purpose
provides a reviewing court with valuable information as to the likely quality of the
agency’s decision, even if the court is ill-equipped to evaluate the details of the agency’s

32

One such argument is the claim that hard look review can counteract the ability of narrow interest
groups to exert undue influence on regulatory agencies to extract special favors at public expense. See
Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative
Agencies, 80 GEO. L. J. 671, 675 (1992); Sargentich, supra note 8, at 631-32; Shapiro & Levy, supra note
8, at 412-13; Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 469 (1987);
Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985) [hereinafter
Interest Groups]. A related argument is that hard look review helps ensure input from a broader base of
agency staff members, with diverse professional backgrounds; absent hard look review, regulations may
reflect the more parochial views of a particular subgroup within the agency. See Pedersen, supra note 31,
at 59-60; Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 506-10. A third argument in this family is that experts are
vulnerable to particular cognitive biases, such as overconfidence and tunnel vision, that hard look review
by lay judges can mitigate. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 588-89, 596-97, 600 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld,
Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
486, 496-99, 509-10, 547-48 (2002). But see William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Structuring
Lawmaking To Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 628-29, 630-31 (2002)
33
On comprehensive rationality – also sometimes referred to as “synoptic” decision-making – see
Diver, supra note 8, at 409-21; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 32, at 64. On the role of judicial
review in promoting deliberation, see Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and
Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 764, 811, 81820; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1570 (1992); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 32, at 61-63.
34
Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1682 (2001).
35
Id. at 1714 (criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of discount rates).
36
Id. at 1711. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Forward: Congress, Constitutional Moments,
and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 294 & n.235 (1996) (stating that judicial review should
be available to “police administrative decisions for reasonableness” and citing Corrosion Proof Fittings);
Sunstein, Defense, supra note 31, at 53 (noting, in an apparent reference to Corrosion Proof Fittings and
other cases, that “[s]ome courts, notably the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have used
the hard look approach to ensure that regulatory controls are well-founded in the facts and in statutory
policy”).
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scientific, economic, social, and political analyses.37 The fact that the agency was able to
supply the court with an explanation that appears reasonable to generalist judges, along
with sufficient references to record evidence, is presumed to be both necessary and
sufficient for a reviewing court to conclude that the regulation is justified.
Critics of hard look review disagree. They argue, first, that the actual process of
government decision-making often bears little resemblance to the formalized statement of
reasons offered in an administrative record. Agency staffers, particularly agency lawyers,
will do their best to generate a record and explanation of reasons adequate to satisfy a
reviewing court. This record-generation activity, however, may have little connection to
the actual decision-making process.38 This problem is compounded by the complaint that
the same lack of expertise that prevents judges from evaluating the substantive merit of
an agency’s decision also impedes their ability to assess whether the agency’s proffered
explanation is sensible. As Professor Martin Shapiro puts it, “Courts cannot take a hard
look at materials they cannot understand nor be partners to technocrats in a realm in
which only technocrats speak the language.”39 Professor Thomas McGarity agrees,
observing that “judges do not always have a good sense for what matters and what does
not in a complex rulemaking initiative.”40 Indeed, while Professor Sunstein uses the
Corrosion Proof Fittings opinion as an illustration of the salutary effects of hard look
review, Professor McGarity’s assessment is much different: “The three judges on the
panel,” he charges, “had no experience with the difficulties encountered in administering
a technically complex regulatory program, and they lacked the expertise in the scientific
37

A related argument is that hard look review forces the government to present its analysis and
conclusions in a form that the courts, and the general public, can understand – if not perfectly, then at least
well enough to assess the reasonableness of the government’s decision. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 82022; Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 665-66 (1997).
38
Martin Shapiro puts the point bluntly: “[I]nstead of telling the truth, agencies can lie; this is mostly
what they do these days. They can dress each of their guestimates about the facts … in enormous,
multilayered costumes of technocratic rationality. They can weave shrouds of data and analysis designed
to proclaim the scientific rationality of every choice they have made.” MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS
THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 151-52 (1988). Agencies accomplish this by
“hir[ing] more lawyers and giv[ing] them more of a role in producing decisions that will withstand court
scrutiny.” Id. at 154. See also Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative
Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1046 (2000); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 8, at 276, 296 & n. 98;
McGarity, supra note 13, at 1328; McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 8, at 1412; Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 67-68, 81-82 (1995) [hereinafter
Seven Ways]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How
Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 27 (1991)
[hereinafter Unintended Effects]; Shapiro, supra note 8, at 490; Tiller, supra note 2, at 1459. Even some
hard look proponents concede that this happens sometimes, though they argue these cases are exceptional.
See Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 520; Seidenfeld, supra note 32, at 514-15.
39
See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1507 (1983).
See also Breyer, supra note 8, at 388-90; Cross, supra note 38, at 1054-55; Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 8,
at 277; McGarity, supra note 13, at 1328-29; McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 8, at 1452; Pierce, Seven
Ways, supra note 38, at 69-70; William H. Rodgers, Jr., Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of
Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVT’L L. 301, 309 (1981); Shapiro, supra
note 8, at 467; SHAPIRO, supra note 38, at 155.
40
McGarity, Ossification, supra note 8, at 550.
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and other analytical methodologies necessary to perform the function that Congress had
delegated to EPA. The judges, in short, lacked the breadth and depth of expertise
necessary to support such confident assertions about how the agency should go about its
assigned business. And they almost certainly got it wrong.”41 Professor McGarity’s
assessment of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in AFL-CIO is similar: A panel of
inexperienced judges imposed expensive and unjustified analytical and evidentiary
requirements on an agency that had acted both lawfully and reasonably.42
In short, the critics claim that the sorts of things that judges look for in hard look
review do not actually have much relationship to the substantive effects of the regulation
under review. If the critics are right about this, then hard look review may fail to serve its
intended purpose. Furthermore, many critics contend that aggressive hard look review is
worse than pointless. Even if in most cases clever lawyers and other agency staffers can
construct a satisfactory post hoc rationalization for whatever decision the agency reached,
this exercise consumes substantial agency resources. Therefore, argue critics of hard
look review, judicially-imposed explanatory requirements make government action more
expensive and therefore make it harder for expert agencies to carry out their assigned
tasks.43 It may at first seem odd to imagine that the requirement that an administrative
agency supply a plausible explanation for its decision would entail more than trivial
costs— at least if the agency had done its job properly. But many scholars who have
studied the practice of hard look review have concluded that the task of “assimilating the
record and drafting the preambles to proposed and final rules” requires a “Hurculean
effort” and “may well be the most time-consuming aspect of informal rulemaking.”44
Sometimes, these costs derive from the fact that the reviewing court demands that the
agency conduct additional studies. In AFL-CIO, for example, the Eleventh Circuit made
clear that OSHA would have to provide detailed additional evidence on hundreds of
chemicals, even though the informational benefit of this additional research may have
been marginal.45 Even when the court requests additional analysis and explanation rather
than additional evidence, the burdens on the agency can be significant in light of the fact
that “these additional analytical requirements invite abuse by regulates who hire
41

Id., at 547.
Id., at 550-52.
43
See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic
Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 286-87 (1992); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE 58 (1993); Breyer, supra note 8, at 383, 391-93; Cross, supra note 38, at 1020-24; Frank B. Cross,
Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1280-81 (1999);
Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 8, at 284-89, 294 , 297-98; McGarity, Ossification, supra note 8, at 535-36;
McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 8, at 1391, 1400-01, 1412-20; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of
Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 71 (1997); Pierce,
Seven Ways, supra note 38, at 67; Pierce, Unintended Effects, supra note 38, at 27; SHAPIRO, supra note 38,
at 152; Sidney A. Shapiro, Substantive Reform, Judicial Review, and Agency Resources: OSHA as a Case
Study, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 645, 652-54 (1997); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 283 (1989). But see
Rossi, supra note 33, at 808-11 (suggesting that impediments to agency policymaking created by hard look
review have the beneficial effect of encouraging groups to seek comprehensive legislative solutions).
44
McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 8, at 1401. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Unruly Judicial
Review of Rulemaking, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 1990, at 23, 23.
45
See McGarity, Ossification, supra note 8, at 550-52.
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consultants and lawyers to pick apart the agencies’ preambles and background documents
and launch blunderbuss attacks on every detail of the legal and technical bases for the
agencies’ rules…. [T]he agencies cannot afford to allow any of the multifaceted attacks
to go unanswered for fear that courts will remand….”46 Moreover, critics charge that
hard look review also may give judges an excuse to strike down policies they dislike on
substantive grounds.47 Again, Professor McGarity puts the claim succinctly: “To
advocate hard look review in the context of the courts’ prescriptive substantive review
function is really to advocate greater discretion on the part of judges to substitute their
views of appropriate statutory policies and analytical methodologies for those of the
agency. In the hands of unsympathetic judges like the author of the Corrosion Proof
Fittings opinion, this is a license to destroy regulatory programs.”48 For these reasons,
critics argue that hard look review imposes substantial costs on agencies and provides
few legitimate benefits to reviewing courts.
The polar positions just described are something of a caricature. Most scholars
involved in the debates over the merits of hard look review articulate more nuanced
views of the effects hard look review and about the proper balance between competing
values at stake in defining the appropriate standard of review under §706 and analogous
statutory provisions.49 That said, it remains the case that most participants in these
debates can be divided between those who think hard look review is helpful to courts and
not too costly for agencies50 and those who think that hard look review conveys little
useful information to courts but imposes substantial costs on agencies that distort their
policy
Understanding
choices.
hard look review in costly signaling terms suggests a different
perspective on this debate. Let us assume, for purposes of developing the signaling
argument, that the critics are correct that judges generally cannot assess the merits of an
expert agency’s explanation for its decision, and that agency staffers can usually prepare
a plausible-sounding post hoc rationale for whatever decision the agency has made. Let
us also assume that the critics are correct that preparing such a record for judicial review
can be quite expensive for the agency. It is precisely this latter characteristic of hard look
46

McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 8, at 1400.
McGarity, Ossification, supra note 8, at 539, 549; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of
Judicial Review of Agency Actions,.44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1110-11, 1120 (1995); Pierce, Unintended Effects,
supra note 38, at 28; Rodgers, supra note 39, at 302.
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McGarity, Ossification, supra note 8, at 549.
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For example, Professor McGarity, one of the most ardent critics of hard look review as currently
practiced, acknowledges that hard look review does reduce the potential for agencies to act irrationally, see
McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 8, at 1451-52, while Professor Seidenfeld, generally a defender of hard
look review, acknowledges its potential problems, see Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 489, 520; Seidenfeld,
supra note 32, at 514-15. Professor Sunstein has attempted to analyze and weigh the costs and the benefits
of hard look review, as well as other forms of judicial review of agency action. See Sunstein, Costs and
Benefits, supra note 31.
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The claim that hard look review is “not too costly” can actually be disaggregated into two separate
claims. First, some commentators suggest that the “reasoned decision-making” requirement of hard look
review is not that hard for agencies to meet. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41
DUKE L.J. 1463, 1470-71 (1992); Wald, supra note 37, at 666. Second, commentators have also argued
that, in those cases where meeting the demands of hard look review may be quite costly, those costs may be
justified by the benefits that this standard of review confers. See, e.g., Strauss, supra, at 1471.
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review that may make it more useful to reviewing courts than most hard look critics or
proponents appreciate. Because the provision of a high-quality explanation is costly to
the agency – consuming time, money, and staff that could have been devoted to other
things – the quality of the agency’s defense of its regulatory decision provides a signal of
the benefits the agency expects to receive if the court upholds the regulation. The quality
of the agency’s explanation therefore provides valuable information to the court even if
the court cannot understand or verify any of the agency’s substantive analysis. The
result, in many cases, will be what looks like hard look review: judicial demand for, and
agency supply of, elaborate explanations and justifications for agency regulations. The
information content of these explanations, however, may often be contained in the
(expensive) style rather than the (incomprehensible) substance.
B. The Logic of Costly Signaling
To illustratethe logic of the theory in greater detail, consider a stylized hypothetical
example in which OSHA is considering whether to set a restrictive exposure limit for a
previously unregulated workplace pollutant.51 If OSHA declines to adopt the regulation,
the courts will not have any occasion to evaluate OSHA’s decision.52 If OSHA does
adopt the regulation, affected industry groups will sue, in which case a federal court will
have to rule on whether OSHA’s decision to impose the regulation was supported by
substantial evidence.53 The reviewing court has two problems. The first is an
asymmetric information problem: OSHA is likely to know much more than the court
about the actual effect of the regulation, so it is difficult for the court to assess the
accuracy of OSHA’s claims regarding the net benefits of the regulation. The second
51

OSHA regulations are frequent targets of a version of hard look judicial review. See, e.g., American
Textile Mfrs. Institute. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157 (11th
Cir. 1994); American Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1993); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d
962 (11th Cir. 1992); American Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Building &
Construction Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Forging Industry Ass’n v. Secretary of Labor,
773 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); ARASCO, Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483 (1984).
52
This assumption neglects the possibility that interested parties can sue to compel OSHA to adopt a
rule. So-called “action-forcing” suits are permitted under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §551(13) (defining “agency
action” as including “failure to act”); §706(1) (empowering reviewing courts to compel agency action
“unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”). However, judicial review of agency decisions not to
initiate rulemaking is “extremely limited and highly deferential,” Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders
Ass’n of America v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656
F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and some courts have described review of agency refusal to initiate
rulemaking as involving a degree of deference “so broad as to make the process akin to non-reviewability,”
Cellnet Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992). There are, however, exceptions to this
general principle, including some in the OSHA context I use as the basis for my stylized hypothetical
example. See, e.g. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 151-59 (3d Cir. 2002);
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505-07 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
53
As noted earlier, the standard of review under the Occupational Safety and Health Act is “substantial
evidence” rather than “arbitrary and capricious,” but this different is not important for purposes of the
analysis in this Article. See supra note 18.
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problem is a divergent preferences problem: OSHA and the court may disagree on the
conditions under which enacting this regulation would be rational. Suppose, for instance,
that the regulation would impose $100 million in annual costs on the national economy.
OSHA might be willing to adopt this regulation if it saved at least five lives per year
(consistent with a statistical life valuation of $20 million), but the court might view the
regulation as rational only if it would save at least ten lives per year (consistent with a
statistical life valuation of $10 million). As a formal doctrinal matter, it may be that the
reviewing court is not supposed to evaluate an OSHA decision in this sort of cost-benefit
framework.54 Be that as it may, the assumption here is that judges have policy
preferences, those preferences can be described in cost-benefit terms, and these
preferences influence judicial assessments of whether an agency decision is adequately
justified.
Let us refer proposed regulation’s impact on salient outcome variables as the payoff
of the regulation.55 In the OSHA hypothetical, we might imagine that the payoff is the
annual number of deaths the regulation will prevent.56 A smart layperson like a federal
judge can get a rough sense, from readily available and easy-to-interpret sources, of the
probability that the payoff is large, small, or somewhere in between.57 From this, the
judge will make an estimate of the true payoff, though this estimate is likely to be highly
uncertain. Call this estimate the expected payoff.58 In contrast to the court, the agency
has specialized expertise. For simplicity, assume that the agency’s expertise allows it to
learn the true payoff (the number of lives the regulation will save) with certainty before
deciding whether to regulate.59 This assumption exaggerates the extent of agency
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See American Textile Mfrs. Institute, 452 U.S. at 490 at 507-22.
In the formal model described, the payoff is the b parameter. See Appendix, infra.
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Of course, the impact of any real regulation will include other factors, including economic cost,
distributional impact, and so forth. To simplify the discussion, we can assume that these other effects are
known with certainty. This assumption is unrealistic but benign. The analysis would be the same if, for
example, both the number of lives saved and the economic costs were unknown. In that case, the unknown
quantity of interest could be characterized as the ratio of cost-per-life saved. The same approach could be
used to incorporate an arbitrarily large number of benefits and costs, as long as all these variables can be
expressed in reduced form as a level of utility to both the agency and the court.
57
In the formal model, the payoff is drawn from a probability distribution with cumulative distribution
function F. See Appendix, infra. Though the subsequent numerical examples use a simple uniform
distribution, the argument does not depend on that type of distribution, as the Appendix demonstrates.
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In the formal model, the expected payoff is the µ parameter. See Appendix, infra. Note that in the
model µ is defined not as E(b), but as E(b-k(b)), where k(b) is an “ignorance penalty” that reflects the fact
that uninformed agencies may regulate less efficiently than informed agencies. See Part II.B, infra. In the
simple version of the analysis discussed here, however, we assume that there is no ignorance penalty (i.e.,
k(b)=0 for all b), so in this case µ =E(b).
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In the formal model, the parameter
{0,1} captures whether or not the agency is informed, and the
parameter p is the probability that the agency is informed (i.e., that =1). The situation described in the
main text, in which the agency is always informed, corresponds to the special case where p=1. See
Appendix, infra.
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expertise, but it simplifies and clarifies the exposition of both the asymmetric information
problem and how hard look review might mitigate that problem.60
To incorporate the divergent preferences problem, assume that both the court and the
agency have a rationality threshold;61 each decision-maker views regulation as rational
only if the payoff exceeds the decision-maker’s rationality threshold. Another way to
think about this is to imagine that a decision-maker’s utility from regulation is equal to
the regulation’s payoff minus the decision-maker’s rationality threshold. The preference
divergence between the agency and the court is thus captured by the difference in their
rationality thresholds.62
If the court’s rationality threshold is below the agency’s – that is, if the agency tends
to be more skeptical than the court of the type of regulation under consideration – then
the court’s best strategy will be to uphold the agency’s decision to regulate, because any
regulation that is good enough for the agency would also be good enough for the court.
In these cases, we would expect consistent patterns of judicial deference to agency
decisions, with only cursory scrutiny of the agencies’ explanations for those decisions.
Agencies, anticipating such mild scrutiny, will not invest substantial resources in
preparing elaborate records. But what if the court’s rationality threshold is higher than
the agency’s? In this case, there are at least some regulations that the agency would
prefer to enact that the court, if fully informed, would view as irrational. In this case,
how does the court decide whether to uphold an agency regulation?
At the moment the court must decide whether or not to uphold the agency’s
regulation, the court has acquired two additional valuable pieces of information that help
it make this decision. First, the simple fact that the agency has regulated signals that the
payoff exceeds the agency’s rationality threshold. This can sometimes be sufficient to
persuade a court to uphold a regulation that the court would have invalidated if the court
had to pass on the regulation in the first instance. This suggests an instrumental account
60

Part II, infra, explores an extension in which the agency may not learn the true payoff before
deciding whether to regulate.
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In the formal model, the agency’s rationality threshold is normalized to 0 and the court’s rationality
threshold is the parameter j+ , where j is a constant and is a random variable with mean 0. Because the
court does not observe , the court’s decision will be based on its expected rationality threshold, E(j+ )=j.
The textual references to the court’s rationality threshold actually refer to this expected rationality
threshold, j. See Appendix, infra.
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The analysis assumes that the agency and the court know one another’s rationality thresholds. This
assumption may be problematic in some cases, but it may be justifiable when considering decision-makers
who interact on a regular basis and know something about one another’s political, philosophical, and
professional backgrounds. Our ability to describe regulatory decision-makers using terms like “extremely
conservative,” “moderately liberal,” etc. suggests an ability to estimate regulatory preferences on a
contin uum. An interesting direction for future research might be to take the basic framework for analysis
laid out in this Article and incorporate mutual uncertainty about preferences, as has been done, for example,
in the political science literature on elections and legislative behavior. See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert,
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence,
29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 69 (1985) (analyzing electoral models in which candidates may be uncertain about
voter preferences); Richard D. McKelvey & Peter C. Ordeshook, Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the
Democratic Ideal, 48 J. POL. 909 (1986) (analyzing electoral models in which voters may be uncertain
about candidate preferences).
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for judicial deference to agency expertise that is consistent with the strong assumption
that judges are outcome-oriented.63 Second, the court can use the quality of the agency’s
explanation for its decision to estimate the cost involved in providing this explanation,
and the court can infer that the payoff of regulation must exceed the sum of the agency’s
rationality threshold and this explanation cost. The result is a pattern of behavior
consistent with hard look review: Agencies anticipate and attempt to satisfy judicial
demands for detailed explanations of policy choices, even though the reviewing courts
are not competent to assess whether these explanations are correct.
1. The Decision to Regulate: An Instrumental Explanation of Deference Norms
Before examining how judicial assessment of the quality of an agency record can
influence the court’s decision whether to uphold an agency’s regulation, consider first the
case where the agency cannot or does not provide any additional explanation for its
action. Even in this case, the agency’s decision to regulate can convince an otherwise
skeptical court to uphold a regulation. Imagine a regulation with an expected payoff
below the court’s rationality threshold. If the court were asked to consider this regulation
in the first instance, it would reject it. But if the same regulation is enacted by an
informed agency, the court can infer that the true payoff is greater than the agency’s
rationality threshold. Otherwise, the agency’s decision to regulate would be irrational.64
This additional information enables the court to adjust upward its estimate of the payoff.
This adjusted payoff estimate may exceed the court’s rationality threshold even if the ex
ante expected payoff did not. If so, the court will uphold a regulation enacted by an
informed agency that the court would otherwise have viewed as irrational.
To illustrate in the context of the OSHA example, suppose that a proposed regulation
will save some number of lives between zero and 20, with any number in that range
equally likely. The court’s expected payoff is therefore 10 lives. Assume that the court’s
rationality threshold is 12 lives, while OSHA’s is six lives. The expected payoff is below
the court’s rationality threshold, meaning that the court initially views this regulation as
irrational. But, if OSHA enacts the regulation, the court can rule out the possibility that
the regulation will save fewer than six lives. This means the true payoff must be between
63

To be clear, I do not mean to endorse the proposition that judges are concerned primarily about
policy outcomes, a hypothesis about which there is substantial empirical controversy. That said, there is
considerable empirical evidence that judges are at least influenced (perhaps subconsciously) by policy
considerations. Furthermore, it is useful to show how patterns of judicial behavior thought to be
inconsistent with outcome-oriented judging, such as deference to other branches of government, can be
shown to arise as instrumentally rational behavior even when one makes the strong assumption that judges
are concerned exclusively about outcomes rather than legal process or role constraints. Cf. Ethan Bueno de
Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AMER.
POL. SCI. REV. 755 (2002) (showing how the norm of stare decisis can arise even in a model that makes the
strong assumption that judges are purely outcome-oriented).
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If the payoff is less than the agency’s rationality threshold, then if the agency succeeds in getting the
regulation past the courts, the agency would suffer a net loss. If the regulation is struck down, then the
agency is no better off than it would have been if it decided not to regulate in the first place. In this
situation, I assume that the agency would choose not to regulate.
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six and 20. Because any payoff in this range is equally likely, the court’s updated
estimate of the true payoff of the regulation is 13. This is above the court’s rationality
threshold, so the court would uphold the regulation.65
This pattern of judicial behavior – upholding a regulation enacted by an informed
agency that the court would otherwise oppose – might be characterized as reluctance by a
reviewing court to “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”66 It is important to
stress, however, that this judicial “deference” is not indicative of judicial reluctance to
focus on outcomes rather than process, or to decide cases according to the judges’ own
views of sound policy. A judge may have an incentive to describe a decision to uphold
an agency’s regulation in terms of respect, restraint, and the like. The above analysis
suggests that judicial deference to agency expertise may also be a rational, instrumental
response to the asymmetric information problem in circumstances where the court’s
preferences are positively but imperfectly correlated with those of the agency.
2. The Quality of the Record: A Costly Signaling Explanation of Hard Look Review
Hard look review calls for courts to engage in “searching and careful” scrutiny of the
agency record for evidence of “consideration of the relevant factors,” “examin[ation of]
the relevant data,” and “articulat[ion of] a satisfactory explanation” for the agency’s
action.67 This approach is exemplified both by cases like Sierra Club and United
Steelworkers, in which the reviewing court upholds an agency’s conclusion only after
extensive scrutiny of the rulemaking record, as well as cases like Corrosion Proof
Fittings and AFL-CIO, in which the reviewing court vacates and remands for further
analysis and evidentiary support. What does this sort of hard look review accomplish?
One possibility, of course, is that it facilitates the court’s effortsto learn what the agency
knows about the true payoff of the regulation, or at least to verify, by scrutinizing the
agency’s supporting evidence and analysis, that the agency’s conclusion that the
regulation is substantially justified. This may be the case in some circumstances, though
critics of hard look review have presented reasons for doubt. Another possibility is that is
that judicial scrutiny of the record is an elaborate charade in which courts find
justifications for making the decisions they would have made anyway. This more cynical
hypothesis may also hold true in some instances, though it is hard to believe that judges
would be so cavalier given their lack of relevant expertise.
This Article advances another possibility: the quality of the agency’s explanation and
justification for its decision – a variable I will refer to as record quality – can act as a
costly signal to the court of the agency’s information about the true payoff.68 That is,
65

This is not to say that the court knows with certainty that the regulation is a good idea from the
court’s perspective. It may be, for example, that the true payoff in this example was seven lives.
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Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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See Overton Park, 401 U.S., at 416; State Farm, 463 U.S., at 43.
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In the formal model, record quality is parameter s, and the cost to the agency of generating record
quality is given by parameter x. See Appendix, infra. It is worth noting that the analysis assumes that the
agency’s selection of record quality does not change the payoff, i.e. the choice of s does not change b.
While this is a reasonable assumption in most cases, there may be circumstances in which this assumption
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when the reviewing court scrutinizes an the evidence and analysis marshaled by an
agency in support of a proposed rule, the court may not be learning anything about the
accuracy of the agency’s conclusions nor observing a substantively reliable indicator of
reasoned decision-making, but the court may nonetheless be learning something about the
agency’s willingness to invest resources into providing the kind of detailed record and
lawyerly analysis that courts consider in hard look review. If so, and if the benefit of a
given regulation to the agency is positively correlated with the expected benefit of that
regulation to the court, then a record of sufficient quality can induce a court to uphold a
regulation it would otherwise oppose, because the expensive record demonstrates that the
agency places a sufficiently high value on the proposed regulation. The agency, in turn,
will factor the costs of providing a sufficiently high-quality record into its decision
whether or not to promulgate a regulation in the first place.
To demonstrate how the signaling argument works, and to differentiate it from other
hypotheses regarding the function of hard look review, let us make the strong assumption
that the judiciary is institutionally incapable of comprehending anything in the
administrative record, and that the type of “reasoned decision-making” the courts can
discern in agency explanations has no inherent substantive link to the quality of the
agency’s actual decision-making process. This assumption may strike some as too
strong. Indeed, I do not believe that a court’s evaluation of the substantive content of an
agency’s explanation is wholly unrelated to the actual quality of the agency’s decision
process. Nonetheless, making this strong assumption is useful for two reasons. First, it
allows analytic isolation of the role that an explanation’s cost, as distinct from its content,
plays in influencing judicial review of agency decisions under the hard look approach.
This Article argues that an explanation’s cost can have an informative function that is
independent of the explanation’s content. It is helpful, in demonstrating this point, to
assume that the explanation’s content is totally useless, even if this assumption is
empirically incorrect. Second, as noted above, many administrative law scholars—
including several of the most influential figures in the field—have taken positions that,
while not quite as extreme as the assumption I make in this Article, are in fact quite
close.69 That said, the assumption that judges are entirely incapable of assessing anything
the agency says on the merits is clearly an exaggeration, and in response to this concern I
70
laterAs
relax
noted
thisabove,
assumption.
the costly
signaling theory assumes further that even if the type of
evidence and analysis the courts demand in hard look review is neither verifiable by the
court nor inherently indicative of high-quality agency decision-making, providing this
type of record is costly to the agency. Furthermore, the theory requires that this costly
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effort be observable by the reviewing court. This assumption is based on the notion that,
even when a judge is not able to differentiate sound analysis from skillful spinning, the
agency’s record will contain indications of the time and effort that went into preparing it.
So, for example, the D.C. Circuit could conclude in United Steelworkers that OSHA’s
analysis of the PEL for lead was based on “voluminous” 71 and “extremely detailed”72
evidence and “careful” measurement,73 that OSHA had explained this evidence
“convincingly,”74 and that even though some of the key issues involved were “technically
complex … combining esoteric medical principles with highly theoretical mathematical
analyses,”75 nonetheless OSHA had provided adequate support for its conclusions on
these points.76 Though terms like “convincing” and “careful” do imply some assessment
of the merits, the thrust of the discussion suggests that the court is responding to the
overall quality of the presentation of the arguments rather than the ultimate correctness of
those arguments. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Sierra Club frankly admitted the limits of
its institutional competence to evaluate the substance of the record, and instead described
its job as “prob[ing] the agency’s rationales” and “stud[ying] its references,” while
generally giving the agency the benefit of the doubt on tough substantive questions.77
Reviewing courts in these and other cases appears to have an easier time figuring out
whether the agency provided a resource- intensive explanation than figuring out whether
this explanation is defensible on the merits.
Because the agency is rational, it wouldnot pursue a regulation that is not worth the
cost of protecting from judicial reversal. The court can therefore update its estimate of
the payoff based on the agency’s investment in record quality, and the court will uphold
an agency action that is accompanied by a sufficiently high-quality record for the court to
infer that the expected payoff is above the court’s rationality threshold. The basic
dynamic can be illustrated with a variation on the OSHA hypothetical. Assume, as
before, that OSHA is contemplating a regulation that will save some numb er of lives
between zero and 20. Any number in that range equally likely ex ante, so the expected
payoff is 10. OSHA’s rationality threshold is 12, but the court’s rationality threshold is
18. If the agency regulates, the court can rule out the possibility that the true payoff is 12
or less. This, however, is not enough for the court to view regulation as rational: If the
true payoff is between 12 and 20, the expected payoff is 16, which is still below the
court’s rationality threshold. But now suppose that OSHA regulates and provides the
court with a detailed record explaining the decision. The court cannot assess the
accuracy of the analysis in this record, but it can tell that the effort that OSHA put into
compiling it was the utility equivalent, to OSHA, of saving four additional statistical
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lives.78 The court can infer from this that the payoff must be at least 16 lives. Because
any payoff between 16 and 20 is equally likely, the court’s updated estimate of the payoff
is 18, which is just high enough that the court would uphold the regulation.
The idea that an agency can place regulatory goals, like the prevention of deaths, and
the resource costs associated with defending legislation on the same scale might initially
seem problematic. This assumption, however, is exactly the same assumption that critics
of hard look make when they posit that the costs associated with judicial review deter
agencies from making certain rules, and it derives from a couple of reasonable
considerations. First, the agency’s private interest in achieving regulatory goals may
diverge from the public interest in achieving those goals. Indeed, it is likely to do so,
given that agencies, even altruistic or politically responsive agencies, are unlikely to
internalize the full benefits of efficient regulation, while the resource costs of providing
high-quality regulation are concentrated in the agency. Second, since agency resources
are finite, devoting more resources to defending any particular regulation means fewer
resources are available for pursuing other activities that the agency decision-makers or
their political overseers consider valuable.
In a nutshell, the costly signaling theory of hard look judicial review postulates that
when courts scrutinize agency records they are drawing inferences about the costs the
agency incurred in generating the record; that these cost estimates are useful to the court
because they indicate how valuable the regulation is to the agency; and that this
information is helpful to the reviewing courts because judicial preferences and agency
preferences, though divergent, are positively correlated in expectation. As a result, a
court will uphold an agency action accompanied by a sufficiently high-quality record that
the court would not uphold if the record were shoddier, even if the content of the record
is not in itself particularly informative.
C. Behavioral Implications and Predictions
As a positive descriptive matter, the costly signaling theory provides an account of
the practice of hard look review that does not depend on the optimistic assumption that
judges can assess the merits of complex agency records nor on the cynical assumption
that scrutiny of a decision-making record is a meaningless charade. This perspective
further suggests a possible reconciliation of seemingly conflicting descriptive claims
about hard look review. For example, many critics of hard look review claim both that
elaborate agency explanations are not very informative to courts and that producing these
explanations is expensive to agencies. These claims are in some tension. If judges do not
learn much from agency records, and instead make uninformed decisions based on their
own views of the merits, why do agencies bother to spend substantial resources on
impressive looking records? A hostile court can always find some explanatory
deficiency, and a sympathetic court can always deem a cursory record sufficient. While
78
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there might be many ways to resolve this tension, understanding agency records in
signaling terms offers a straightforward resolution: Agency explanations are persuasive
because they are costly.
Similarly, the signaling theory provides a more satisfying account for the casual
observation that uninformed judges do appear to look carefully at agency records, and
aggrieved litigants do their best to point out flaws, inconsistencies, and omissions in
those records. Critics have argued persuasively that agency records often do not reflect
actual decision-making processes and that courts are ill -equipped to evaluate either the
records or the litigant critiques. If the benefits of hard look review are understood in
terms of its efficacy in identifying flawed agency reasoning, the critics’ objections have
substantial bite. But if judicial scrutiny of the record is understood as an effort by judges
to ascertain how much effort the agency devoted to preparing a defense of a regulation, it
is not necessarily undermined by the claim that agency records do not reflect the actual
decision-making process or by the claim that courts cannot understand them.
The signaling theory also provides an alternative perspective on the claim that
aggressive hard look review leads to the “ossification” of agency rulemaking because of
the decision costs it imposes on agencies. Critics of hard look review often portray
ossification as the unintended consequence of aggressive review by well-meaning but
shortsighted judges.79 But if the generation of a record is a form of costly signaling, then
ossification, understood as the deterrence of rulemaking in cases where the agency views
the judicially-imposed explanation costs as greater than the rule’s expected net benefits,
may be precisely what hard look review is supposed to accomplish.80 Courts cannot
assess regulatory benefits directly, so they establish a type of review under which it is too
expensive for agencies to enact regulations that have low value to the agency and
negative expected value to the courts. Ossification, on this view, need not be the result of
an individual or collective failure of judicial rationality or foresight. Instead, ossification
may be the pejorative name assigned to the effective screening out by judges of
regulations that are sufficiently low-value that they would be considered irrational, and
therefore unlawful, by a fully informed reviewing court.
The costly signaling argument also provides a fuller theoretical account for the
common claim that “whether the court will dig deeply or bow cursorily depends … on
whether the judge agrees with the result of the administrative decision.”81 When the
agency is more skeptical of the type of regulation at issue than the court is, the agency
need not make any substantial investment in record quality. Even in cases where the
court is somewhat more skeptical of regulation than the agency, the simple fact that the
informed agency decided to regulate is sometimes enough to convince the court that the
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expected benefit of regulation is positive.82 But, as the court becomes more skeptical
than the agency of regulation – that is, as the court’s rationality threshold becomes higher
relative to the agency’s – then the record quality required by the court to uphold
regulation goes up.83 The need to provide a higher quality record will, in turn, cause the
agency not to regulate in some cases where it otherwise would have. Greater judicial
skepticism of regulation therefore generally leads to better records, less agency action,
and greater average expected benefits for the actions that the agency does undertake.
Greater judicial hostility toward a particular type of regulation, however, need not
lead to any noticeable change in the rate at which courts strike down agency decisions.
Indeed, if the agency and court are both perfectly rational and perfectly informed, no
agency action would ever be struck down unless the agency for some reason wanted to be
reversed. In the real world, courts do invalidate some agency actions, though recent
studies suggest that courts rarely remand significant agency rules in a way that interferes
substantially with the agency’s ability from achieving its main regulatory goals.84 The
existence of some number of reversals in the real world may be attributable to the fact
that agencies are uncertain about the preferences of the reviewing court, or to imprecision
in judicial estimates of the agency effort (in utility terms) that went into any given record.
When information is incomplete, even perfectly rational agencies may adopt a strategy
that results in some number of reversals. There is no necessary reason, however, for
reversals to go up as the court becomes more hostile to regulation.
One other potentially interesting empirical implication of the costly signaling account
is worth noting. It may that some agencies are better at producing high-quality records
than other agencies are. If record quality is valuable insofar as it provides evidence of the
cost incurred by the agency, then agencies capable of producing high quality records at
lower marginal cost – for example, agencies with a large staffs of highly skilled lawyers
and other professionals, or agencies with lower opportunity costs – will have to produce
higher quality records to survive judicial review than will agencies that find producing
high-quality records more difficult. This observation implies that agencies do not realize
a long-term benefit from improvements in their capacity to generate high-quality records.
As an agency becomes better at crafting high-quality records, it will have to produce an
even more impressive record in order to signal to the court that it invested substantial
resources in preparing that record.85 The agency is advantaged by improvements in
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capacity to generate record quality only until the court realizes that the agency’s capacity
has improved; such improvements will not produce any sustained increase in the
agency’s ability to get regulation upheld by the courts, even though the quality of the
records the agency produces will improve.86 This hypothesis contrasts with what one
would expect if high-quality records are useful because they communicate substantive
information to the reviewing court. If that were the case, then greater capacity to
generate high-quality records would mean that the agency can reduce its spending on
record quality without altering the quality of the end product.
D. Objections
The costly signaling argument advanced in this Article is neither universally
applicable nor exclusive of other possible functions of hard look review. For instance,
though the preceding analysis isolated the signaling function of hard look review by
assuming courts could not learn anything useful from the content of agency records, it is
possible – indeed, it is likely – that agency records may sometimes convey some accurate
substantive information about a regulation’s likely impact. Even with this caveat,
though, the costly signaling account of hard look review is subject to at least three serious
objections. The first is that the argument’s two key assumptions – that there is a positive
correlation between the expected benefit of regulation to the court and the benefit of
regulation to the agency, and that the court can use record quality as a signal of the
agency’s willingness to incur costs – are substantively implausible. The second objection
is that the costly signaling account is inconsistent with how judges and agency personnel
understand and describe the function and effect of hard look review. The third objection
is that the costly signaling argument does not explain why the agency would signal to the
court by preparing a high quality record rather than byincurring co sts in some other way.
While these criticisms are well-taken, they do not undermine the theoretical or empirical
plausibility of appropriately modest versions of the theory.
1. Plausibility of the assumptions
As noted at the outset, the costly signaling explanation for hard look review has
purchase only when the expected benefit of regulation to the court is positively correlated
with the benefit of regulation to the agency, and when the court can use record quality to
make reasonably accurate inferences about agency expenditures on record preparation.
Both of these assumptions might be attacked on substantive grounds.
Consider first the assumption that the expected benefit of a policy to the reviewing
court is positively correlated with the benefit of the policy to the agency. This
reject that suggestion, see Salameda, 70 F.3d, at 449, though something like this consideration might still
affect judges’ assessments of agency explanations tacitly or subconsciously.
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assumption is important because the costly signaling argument is built around the idea
that the more the agency cares about enacting a regulation, the more likely it is that the
court, if fully informed, would be willing to uphold it. As demonstrated above, this
condition does not require that the government and the court have identical preferences;
indeed, if preferences are identical, signaling is unnecessary. The positive correlation
assumption is valid as long as the government and the court share the same basic
objectives (e.g., safety, security, productivity, efficiency, equity) even if they disagree
intensely on the relative importance of these values and about how they should be traded
off when they conflict. That sort of disagreement is captured in the difference between
the respective rationality thresholds of the agency and the court. But what if the agency
cares about advancing policy goals that the court deems irrelevant, or vice versa?
Suppose, for example, that the phenomenon of agency “capture” by regulated entities
leads an agency to value certain goals – say, the protection of incumbent firms from entry
– that the courts do not think are valid considerations when deciding whether a regulation
is rational.87 If one believes that this or similar phenomena are widespread, does that
mean that the costly signaling argument is generally inapplicable?
The answer is yes in extreme cases but otherwise no. If the agency cares exclusively
about factors deemed irrelevant by the court, then the positive correlation assumption
would not hold and the agency could not influence the court’s decision by spending
resources on record quality. But if one assumes, more plausibly, that the agency shares at
least some goals with the court, then the positive correlation assumption will hold even if
the agency also cares about objectives the court deems irrelevant. In cases where the
court and the agency have the same information about the factor the court deems
irrelevant, then the divergence between the court’s goals and the agency’s goals is
captured by the difference in their rationality thresholds. Even if the agency is better
informed about this factor, then the positive correlation assumption will continue to hold:
Though the agency’s interest in other goals introduces more “noise” into the signal it
sends to the reviewing court, it remains the case that the expected payoff to the court is
higher if the payoff to the agency is higher.88 There is no guarantee, of course, that a
high payoff to the agency means a high payoff to the court. It may be that the high
payoff to the agency is exclusively or primarily due to factors the court views as
irrelevant. But all that the signaling argument requires is that, in expectation, a high
payoff to the agency is more likely to mean a high payoff to the court.
A simple variant on the OSHA example may help illustrate this point. Suppose that
the court cares only about lives saved, but that OSHA cares about two things: the number
of statistical lives the regulation will save and the political benefits from adopting the
regulation that are independent of its life-saving effects. This latter benefit might arise,
for example, because the regulation might have some symbolic value to the agency or its
political principals, or because regulatory burdens will fall disproportionately on the
87
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current administration’s political opponents. The court cares about lives saved but not
about these other political considerations. In this example, let us assume that the number
of lives the regulation will save is equally likely ex ante to be any number between zero
and 20, and the political benefit of the regulation to the agency will have some value that
can be expressed, in life-equivalent terms, as some number between zero and 20, with
any value in this range equally likely ex ante. Thus, the expected payoff of the regulation
to OSHA is 20, but the expected payoff of the regulation to the court is 10. Now suppose
further that OSHA’s rationality threshold is 10; that the court’s rationality threshold is 15;
and that OSHA but not the court becomes informed as to both the number of lives saved
and the political value of the regulation. If OSHA regulates without investing anything in
record quality, the court can infer that the payoff of the regulation to OSHA was between
10 and 40. The court’s estimate of the expected payoff of the regulation to OSHA is
therefore 25. The court knows that the both the number of lives saved and the political
benefits are between 5 and 20, and each has an expected value of 12.5. Because the ex
post expected number of lives saved (12.5) is below the court’s rationality threshold (15),
the court would not uphold the regulation.
But suppose that OSHA in this example regulates and spends the utility equivalent of
10 statistical lives on record quality. In this case, the court can conclude that the payoff
to OSHA was at least 20, so the court can infer that the expected payoff of the regulation
to OSHA is 30. That means the expected payoff to the court, i.e. the expected number of
lives saved, is 15. This is equal to the court’s rationality threshold, so the court would be
willing to uphold the regulation. Of course, the court does not know for certain that the
regulation will actually save 15 lives. In fact, it is possible that OSHA learned that the
regulation would save zero lives but would confer a political benefit worth 20 lives to the
agency. If that turns out to be the case, then the court’s payoff would be zero, well below
its rationality threshold of 10. Nonetheless, the court’s expectedpayoff is 15, so it would
rationally uphold the regulation. More generally, in this example the agency’s payoff is
positively correlated with the court’s expected payoff, so the court will be willing to
uphold an agency regulation if the agency spends enough on record quality, even in a
case where the court knows that the agency is also motivated by concerns that the court
would view as irrelevant.
Then costly signaling theory’s second key assumption is that courts can make
relatively good estimates of the cost, in utility terms, that the government invested in
producing an explanation for its decision. This assumption is vulnerable to two
substantive attacks. First, some might argue that the cost to an administrative agency of
producing an impressive record is so trivial that it can never function as an effective
signal. That claim runs counter to the widespread belief that satisfactory compliance with
judicially-imposed explanatory requirements entails substantial costs. 89 This is ultimately
an empirical dispute, and its resolution is beyond the scope of the present Article. The
second point of vulnerability for this assumption concerns the plausibility of the notion
that judges can infer the cost incurred by the agency from the quality of the record. The
89
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idea that judges can infer the exact cost incurred by the agency is, of course, absurd. But
the argument does not require such extreme precision. It is reasonable to suppose that a
judge can tell the difference between a record that was the product of thousands of hours
of work by dozens of skilled personnel and one that was slapped together in a couple of
days by some interns, even if the judge acquires no better understanding of the technical
or factual bases for decision from the former type of record than from the latter. It is
likewise reasonable to suppose that judges recognize, intuitively if not consciously, that it
is expensive for government decision-makers to produce impressive-looking records.
That said, the efficiency of record quality as a signal degrades as judges’ ability to draw
inferences about the costs associated with record quality worsens.
To be clear, the plausibility of the costly signaling explanation for hard look review,
as with any positive theory of this type, depends on the plausibility of the underlying
assumptions. If the fact that an administrative agency cares intensely about enacting a
particular regulation does not cause a court to adjust upward the court’s estimate of the
regulation’s benefits, then the agency cannot improve its chances of surviving judicial
review by employing a signaling mechanism of the sort discussed in this Article.
Similarly, if the court cannot draw inferences about the costs the agency incurred from
the quality of the record, then record quality cannot function as a useful signal. The
necessary assumptions, however, are less demanding and more empirically plausible than
they may initially appear.
2. Inconsistency with insider accounts
Judges and administrators do not explain the function and effect of hard look review
in signaling terms. That is not to say there are no explicit judicial statements consistent
with the theory’s premises. The pages of the Federal Reporter are replete with candid
recognitions of the asymmetric information problem.90 Judges have also sometimes
indicated, at least indirectly, that they recognize that the production of records and other
forms of explanation taxes agency resources.91 And courts do occasionally make explicit
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reference to the size or detail of the agency’s record in a way that suggests this may have
influenced the court’s views on whether the agency acted rationally. For example, in
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court
observed, in support of its decision upholding a Nuclear Regulator Commission rule
related to the environmental impact of nuclear power, that the “sheer volume of
proceedings before the Commission is impressive and that “the Commission’s Statement
of conclusions announcing the … [challenged] rule shows that it has digested this mass of
material….”92 Nonetheless, judicial opinions generally do not explain decisions in hard
look cases in terms of the cost to the agency of preparing the record presented to the court
for review. Agency officials, to the extent that they offer any explanation for the factors
that influence preparation of a record, also do not generally characterize their actions in
terms of impressing judges with how much the record cost to produce in order to signal
how much the agency values the regulation.
While the costly signaling hypothesis would doubtless be stronger if it found support
in the explanations and accounts given by judges and administrators, the fact that these
agency considers the action “significant enough.” The latter type of reasoning would correspond closely to
the costly signaling theory, even if the situation and reasoning in Ottati & Goss itself does not.
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individuals do not describe hard look review as a signaling mechanism is not necessarily
strong empirical evidence that the hypothesis is incorrect, for two reasons. First, even if
judges and administrators understood their behavior in signaling terms, there would be
powerful reasons to be less than candid about this. Judges are likely to prefer to portray
their decisions as driven by considerations of judicial modesty or deference, or as based
on a close analysis of agency reasoning. Administrators likewise have little incentive to
describe the materials they submit to courts as expensive indications of commitment with
little connection to the actual decision-making process, even if that were the main
function of these materials. Second, and more importantly, it is not necessary that judges
and administrators subjectively understand record production and hard look review in
signaling terms. Just as an illiterate street vendor intuitively understands the concept of
marginal cost, and the average used car buyer intuitively understands adverse selection,
judges may have an intuitive sense that impressive looking records demonstrate serious
commitment, and judges may also have a general, perhaps subconscious intuition that
they ought to give more latitude to agencies that have demonstrated serious commitment
than to those that have not. Meanwhile, agencies may have a general understanding that
to get something by a skeptical reviewing court they have to do more to demonstrate
serious commitment than they would if the court were more sympathetic to the type of
regulation in question. The institution of hard look review was probably not designed to
serve a costly signaling function, but if judges and administrators have the sort of
intuitions just described, then hard look review may end up serving that function.
Ultimately, the question whether the costly signaling theory captures something
important about the underlying causes of court or agency behavior ultimately turns on the
theory’s ability to provide a parsimonious account for a diverse set of empirical
observations and to generate additional hypotheses that perform well in comparative
empirical tests against rivals. This Article has suggested some ways in which the costly
signaling theory of hard look review may account for aspects of the practice of hard look
review that might otherwise appear anomalous or difficult to reconcile. The Article also
suggests additional hypotheses that are in principle testable, though conducting such tests
is beyond this Article’s scope. These sorts of empirical tests will prove more important
than the self-reporting of judges and administrators in establishing whether the costly
signaling theory has any validity.
3. The unexplained choice of signaling mechanism
Another important objection to the idea that record quality functions as a costly signal
is the failure of the argument to account for the agency’s choice of signaling mechanism.
If all that the agency is doing, when it compiles a high-quality record, is “burning
money” in order to demonstrate the value it places on the proposed regulation, why does
the agency signal through record quality rather than something else? The inability to
account for the choice of signal mechanism is a limitation shared by many signaling
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models.93 Some scholars have advanced explanations as to why individuals or
institutions would signal through particular types of behavior, even when more
straightforward types of signals – including literal money burning – appear available.94
These attempts, however, have not been entirely satisfactory. Although a full
consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, there are several possible
answers to this concern.
One possibility is that courts are better at assessing record quality and its associated
costs than they are at assessing the costs associated with other possible signals.95 Perhaps
judges, due to their experience as lawyers and their regular evaluation of briefs, motions,
and other written arguments, are fairly good at figuring out what it takes to produce a
quality argument of this sort. If so, provision of a high-quality record may be a relatively
efficient way for agencies to signal. One problem with this explanation is that courts
must be able to figure out the subjective cost incurred by the agency whose decision is
under review, and it is harder to tell a convincing story why courts would be particularly
adept at making those sorts of judgments. Still, the question is not whether record quality
is an ideal signal, but whether it is better than other available options, and it is at least
conceivable that in some contexts record quality is one of the best available alternatives.
Another possibility is that even if other signaling mechanisms are possible and
potentially more effective, judicial review of agency record quality was already built into,
or at least compatible with, the system of judicial review of administrative action that had
evolved over time under the APA. The legal and political actors who influenced the
evolution of that system may never have consciously intended for the agency record
quality to function as a costly signal, nor did they consider other mechanisms that might
provide an equivalent or superior signaling function. Nonetheless, the system that
emerged provides opportunities for agencies to signal to the court through record quality,
even if no one consciously developed the system with that function in mind.96 In that
sense, the objection that judges and administrators do not consciously think about hard
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See Bernheim & Redding, supra note 2, at 464-65; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 2, at 799-800;
ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 155 (2000); Richard McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law,
Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 640 (2001).
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See, e.g., Bernheim & Redding, supra note 2, at 465-75; B. Douglas Bernheim, Tax Policy and the
, at 155.
Dividend Puzzle, 22 RAND J. ECON. 455, 465-67 (1991); POSNER, supra note 93
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This argument is analogous to the claim that the optimal type of “money burning” signal is one
where the observer of the signal knows the true costs of the signal to the sender; a signal is less effective if
it is more costly to some types of sender than to others, if the observer cannot tell the difference. See
Bernheim & Redding, supra note 2, at 465-75; see also Bernheim, supra note 93, at 465-67. Similarly,
Eric Posner suggests that the reason certain social behaviors are used as costly signals of individual
discount rates, but other costly behaviors are not, is that people are better at assessing the costs associated
with familiar actions and so are better at interpreting the signals that they send. POSNER, supra note 93, at
155. But see Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social Norms, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 867, 878 &
n. 41 (pointing out that even unfamiliar actions, such as literally burning money, can have a more
transparent cost structure than other more familiar behaviors).
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look review in costly signaling terms may provide a partial answer to the objection that
other more efficient signaling mechanisms might be available.
A related possibility is that agency records may perform both a signaling function and
some other function. Most obviously, it may be the case that the agency record actually
does provide the court with some useful substantive information, or at least has the
potential to do so in some instances. Or, if we make the assumption, discussed below,
that the quality of the record may also help the reviewing court to distinguish between
expert agencies and ignorant agencies, then expert agencies would always prefer to signal
using record quality, and ignorant agencies would mimic this behavior to avoid giving
themselves away.97
Finally, the fact that record quality may function as a signaling mechanism does not
mean that agencies never use other mechanisms, either in addition to or instead of highquality records. For example, an agency may signal the value it places on a particular
regulation by investing a great deal of political capital in publicizing and promoting the
regulation. If this or some other sort of agency behavior is both costly to the agency and
observable by the reviewing court, then the agency might signal this way, instead of or in
addition to signaling through record quality. A richer account of the relationship between
regulating agencies and reviewing courts might incorporate, and explain the interactions
and relative importance of, multiple signaling mechanisms.
II. EXTENSION: IMPERFECT AGENCY EXPERTISE
The preceding analysis assumed that the agency is always better-informed than the
court about the true payoff of regulation. This assumption, though useful in
demonstrating the basic intuition of the argument, is probably too strong. Here I consider
one way in which this assumption might be relaxed: Instead of assuming that the agency
always knows the true payoff before deciding whether to regulate, let us assume that
there is some probability that the agency will become informed, but there is also some
probability that it will learn nothing.98 I will use the term expertise to refer to the
probability that the agency is informed.99
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See infra TAN 106-107.
Another possible approach would allow the agency’s information about the true payoff to vary
continuously rather than dichotomously. One way to do this might be to suppose that the agency observes
a noisy signal about the payoff, and the noise associated with this signal is inversely correlated with the
agency’s expertise. The dichotomous case is easier both analytically and expositionally, so I defer to future
research an extension that allows an agency’s information about the true payoff to vary on a continuum.
99
In the formal model, the agency’s expertise is the p parameter, which is the ex ante probability that
=1. It is important to emphasize the difference between the ex ante probability of becoming informed and
the ex post fact of being informed. In ordinary conversation, the word “expert” is often used to describe
either or both of these characteristics. For example, when we say an engineer is an expert on accident
reconstruction, we mean that she is likely to be able to determine the causes of a particular accident, not
that she necessarily will succeed in doing so. But when we say a scientist is an expert on Einstein’s theory
of relativity, we usually mean that she actually knows it, not that she’s likely to know it. I am using
“expertise” in the former sense. This reflects the fact that we say, for example, that OSHA has specialized
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Incorporating the possibility that the agency may be uninformed introduces three
features not present in the original analysis. First, the court will use the agency’s
decision to regulate and the quality of the record to draw inferences from about whether
the agency is informed. This leads to hypotheses regarding how the behavior of the
agency and court change as the agency’s expertise changes. Second, it may that uninformed agencies regulate less efficiently or effectively than informed agencies. Third,
uninformed agencies may face higher marginal costs of producing high-quality records.
Introducing this possibility is one way to capture the idea that courts have some ability to
evaluate the substance of agency records while preserving the idea that sufficient effort
by the agency can obscure analytical flaws.
A. Optimal Record Quality With Imperfect Agency Expertise
1. Court inferences about agency information
If an agency learns the true payoff sometimes but not always, then the agency’s
decision to regulate and its spending on record quality will provide the court with
additional information about whether the agency is informed, as well as information
about what the agency learned if it was informed. In some cases, the simple fact that the
agency regulated signals that the agency is informed. This is easiest to see in an extreme
case. Return to the OSHA example. Assume that the expected payoff is 10 and that
OSHA’s rationality threshold is 12. Assume further that OSHA’s expertise is minimal
but not nonexistent: the probability that OSHA learns the payoff before deciding whether
to regulate is 5%. In the 95% of cases where OSHA remains uninformed, it would not
regulate because the expected payoff is below OSHA’s rationality threshold. The only
circumstances in which OSHA would regulate is when OSHA both becomes informed
and learns that the true payoff is 12 or more. The court can therefore infer from the fact
that OSHA regulated that both of these circumstances existed, no matter how unlikely
this was ex ante.
In other cases, the fact that the agency regulated may reduce the court’s estimate of
the probability that the agency is informed. Consider a version of the OSHA hypothetical
in which the expected payoff is 10, OSHA’s rationality threshold is eight, and its
probability of learning the true payoff is 50%. If OSHA remains uninformed, it would
nonetheless prefer to regulate because the expected payoff is above OSHA’s rationality
threshold. If OSHA becomes informed, it prefers to regulate if but only if the payoff is
eight or more. Therefore, if OSHA regulates, the court cannot rule out the possibility that
OSHA was uninformed (a 50% probability ex ante), nor can the court rule out the
possibility that OSHA was informed and observed a payoff of eight or more (a 30%
probability ex ante). The court can, however, rule out the possibility that OSHA was
informed and observed a payoff below eight (a 20% probability ex ante). From this, the
court can adjust its estimate of the probability that OSHA was informed from 50% to
37.5%.100
expertise in workplace safety, we usually mean that OSHA is more likely than other decision-makers to
analyze a workplace safety issue correctly, not that it knows the answers to all questions on this topic.

A SIGNALING THEORY OF HARD LOOK REVIEW

31

The agency can also use spending on record quality to signal to the court that it is
informed. Suppose in the OSHA example that the expected payoff is 10, OSHA’s
rationality threshold is eight, and OSHA’s ex ante probability of becoming informed is
50%. If OSHA regulates and spends nothing on record quality, the court’s ex post
estimate of the probability that the agency is informed is 37.5%. But suppose OSHA
regulates and spends an amount on record quality that is just greater, in utility terms, than
the benefit to OSHA of saving two additional lives. The court can now infer that OSHA
was definitely informed, because otherwise OSHA’s decision to regulate and produce a
record of such quality would be irrational.
2. The impact of expertise on record quality
How does an agency’s expertise—again, defined as the ex ante probability of
becoming informed—affect the record quality demanded by courts and supplied by
agencies? As before, the agency that chooses to regulate will spend the minimum
amount necessary to protect its regulation from judicial reversal. If that amount is
sufficiently high that an uninformed agency would never regulate, then variation in
agency expertise has no effect on the quality of the records that regulating agencies
produce. The reason is that if the court knows that only informed agencies will regulate,
then the court’s demand for record quality is unaffected by the ex ante probability that the
agency would become informed. The frequency of regulation, however, would be
affected by agency expertise, because uninformed agencies will pass on opportunities to
enact regulation that an informed agency would recognize are worth the costs associated
withIfhard
the minimum
look review.
spending on record quality necessary to survive judicial review is not
enough to guarantee that only informed agencies regulate, then expertise does affect
record quality. To see this, return to the OSHA hypothetical and imagine that the
regulation is equally likely ex ante to save any number of lives between zero and 20
(which means the expected payoff is 10), OSHA has a 50% chance of becoming
informed, OSHA’s rationality threshold is six, and the court’s rationality threshold is
11.5. If OSHA regulates and spends the utility equivalent of four lives on record quality,
the court can infer with certainty that OSHA is informed, and the court’s updated
estimate of the expected payoff (15) is more than sufficient for the court to uphold the
regulation. But OSHA does not need to spend so much. Suppose OSHA only spends the
utility equivalent of two lives on record quality. This is not enough to guarantee that
OSHA is informed; the ex post probability that it is informed in this example is 37.5%.101
The court calculates its updated expected payoff by multiplying the probability that
OSHA was uninformed when it regulated (62.5%) by the expected payoff from
100

By Bayes’ Rule, the probability that OSHA is informed given that it regulated is equal to the
probability that the agency would regulate if it is informed (60%), times the probability that it is informed
(50%), divided by the sum of (1) the probability that the agency would regulate if it is informed (60%)
times the probability it is informed (50%), and (2) the probability that the agency would regulate if it is
(0.6 )(0.5 )

uninformed (100%) times the probability it is uninformed (50%). (0.6 )(0.5 )+1(0.5 )
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See supra note 100.

=

0.6
1.6

= 0.375 .
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regulation by an uninformed agency (10), and adding this to the product of the
probability that OSHA was informed when it regulated (37.5%) and the expected payoff
of regulation if OSHA was informed (14).102 The court can therefore infer an expected
payoff of (0.375 x 14)+(0.625 x 10)=11.5. This is high enough for the court to uphold
the regulation, even though the court cannot rule out the possibility that the agency was
uninformed when it regulated. There is therefore no reason for the agency to spend more
on record quality.
In this type of case, increasing agency expertise lowers the quality of the records that
regulating agencies produce. The reason is that the higher the ex ante probability the
agency is informed, the higher the court’s ex post estimate of the probability that the
agency actually was informed when it regulated. There is therefore less need for the
agency to signal that, if it was informed, it must have observed a very high payoff. In
other words, expert agencies do not need to do as much, in terms of elaborate and
expensive justification, in order to get their regulations upheld by the courts, and for this
reason more expert agencies can get away with providing lower-quality records.103 This
result is somewhat counterintuitive. One might have expected that, on average, more
expert agencies would produce higher-quality records. This would indeed be the case if
the quality of the record was a true reflection of the agency’s understanding and analysis
of the substantive issue. But if record quality is primarily a signal of intensity of
preference, then it may be uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the agency’s
expertise. If uninformed agencies would not regulate, then expertise will be uncorrelated
with record quality; if uninformed agencies would regulate, then greater agency expertise
will translate into lower-quality records, all else equal. Operationalizing these prediction
will likely prove challenging, but it is in principle the predictions are testable.
B. Information and Regulatory Efficiency

Sometimes the information an agency acquires in the course of its research not only
helps it estimate the payoff more accurately, it also allows the agency to regulate more
efficiently. For example, OSHA’s research into the chemical properties of a potentially
hazardous substance may lead the agency to tailor its regulations in a more appropriate
way or to use more accurate methods for measuring compliance, with the end result that
the regulation saves more lives at lower cost. This effect may be independent of the
purely informational benefit OSHA obtains by acquiring more accurate information about
a regulation’s impact. To put the point another way, successful research may not only
help the agency learn the payoff, it may also increase the payoff. One way to
conceptualize this phenomenon and integrate it into the earlier analysis is to characterize
the difference in the quality of regulation by an informed agency and regulation by an
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Because OSHA’s rationality threshold is six and the record quality entails a utility cost of two, the
fact that OSHA regulated means that, if OSHA were informed, the true payoff that OSHA observed must
have been between eight and 20. Because of the assumption that any payoff in this range is equally likely,
the expected payoff of regulation conditional on OSHA being informed is 14.
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The formal version of this result is given in Remark 2. See Appendix, infra.

A SIGNALING THEORY OF HARD LOOK REVIEW

33

uninformed agency as an ignorance penalty associated with uninformed regulation.104
Because the ignorance penalty lowers the expected payoff of uninformed regulation, its
impact on record quality can be analyzed by considering how record quality would
change as the expected payoff of uninformed regulation decreases.105
First, lowering the expected payoff of uninformed regulation makes it less likely that
the agency can get away with regulating when the court is unsure whether the agency is
informed. The reason is that a lower expected payoff means the cost to the court of
uninformed regulation is higher. If, despite this cost, the court would uphold regulation
even when record quality is not high enough to ensure that the regulating agency is
informed, then decreasing the expected payoff of uninformed regulation (i.e., increasing
the ignorance penalty) will increase record quality: As the costs associated with
uninformed regulation go up, the agency must compensate by signaling that the benefits
associated with informed regulation have also gone up.
Next, consider the effect of the ignorance penalty on record quality in cases where
only an informed agency would regulate. If the minimum amount the agency must spend
on record quality is more than enough to signal that the agency is informed, changes in
the ignorance penalty have no effect on record quality. This is because, if only informed
agencies regulate, then the expected payoff of uninformed regulation does not affect the
court’s expected benefit from upholding regulation. But, if the minimum record quality
necessary to survive judicial review is just enough to signal that the agency is informed,
then increases in the ignorance penalty decrease record quality: If record quality must be
just high enough that the uninformed agency would not regulate, any decrease in the
benefit of uninformed regulation to the agency decreases the amount the agency needs to
spend to signal that it is informed.
These observations imply no straightforward relationship between the ignorance
penalty and the quality of the records that agencies produce. To predict the ignorance
penalty’s effect on record quality, one must know more about what exactly the agency
must signal to satisfy the court. If the agency does not need to prove it is informed,
increasing the ignorance penalty increases record quality. If the regulating agency needs
to send a signal just strong enough to convince the court that it is informed, increasing the
ignorance penalty decreases record quality. If the agency must provide the court with a
record that goes beyond the minimum necessary to show that the agency is informed,
changing the size of the ignorance penalty has no direct effect on record quality.
C. Information and Record Quality Costs

The assumption that agency staff can produce equally impressive-looking records
regardless of whether the agency actually succeeded in acquiring valuable information
may be plausible in some circumstances, but it is also possible that informed agencies
have an easier time producing impressive records than uninformed agencies do. This
In the formal model, the ignorance penalty is parameter k(b). The µ parameter incorporates k
directly because µ is defined as E(b-k(b)). See Appendix, infra.
105
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possibility provides one way to relax the assumptions, made in the preliminary analysis,
that courts are entirely incapable of assessing the content of an agency record on the
merits.106 We might suppose that courts, though unable to verify whether an agency’s
ultimate conclusions are true or not, have some limited ability to tell whether a record
was produced by a truly expert agency or not. Uninformed agencies, however, might still
be able to “fake it” – providing a record that looks good enough that the reviewing court
is unable to spot the flaws – but doing so takes more time and effort than would be
required if the agency were truly expert and could provide a more “honest” record. It
may also be that at least some policy-relevant factual information, if discovered by the
agency, could be included in the administrative record, even if the court is not able to
understand the substance of the explanation. Thus, while both informed agencies and
uninformed agencies may be able to produce records of similar quality, uninformed
agencies may face higher marginal costs of record quality production. Call the difference
between the marginal record quality costs for uninformed agencies and informed
agencies the ignorance tax.107
What effect does the ignorance tax have on record quality? As with the ignorance
penalty, the answer is not straightforward. In cases where uninformed agencies would
still regulate, increases in the ignorance tax have no direct effect on record quality. Such
increases do, however, make it less likely that courts will be unsure whether a regulating
agency is informed, because if the ignorance tax is high enough, it is no longer worth it to
the uninformed agency to “fake it.” In cases where the court demands and receives
record quality beyond the minimum required to demonstrate that the agency is informed,
then the ignorance tax again has no direct effect on record quality because in these cases
only informed agencies regulate. The ignorance tax does, however, have a direct effect
in cases where the record quality sufficient to satisfy the court is just high enough to
signal that the agency is informed. In such cases, increasing the ignorance tax decreases
record quality, because it takes less record quality for informed agencies to differentiate
themselves from uninformed agencies.108
Speaking more generally, when the relative cost to an uninformed agency of
providing a high-quality record goes up, record quality may decline, because it takes less
record quality to signal to the court that the agency is informed. This effect only occurs,
however, when the need to signal that the agency is informed is the factor that determines
106

See supra TAN 70.
In the formal model, the ignorance tax is parameter t. See Appendix, infra. Note that if the
ignorance tax is infinite, then only an informed agency can produce a quality record. This special case
corresponds to a situation in which it is impossible for an uninformed agency to pass itself off as informed.
One important limitation of the analysis here is that although the ignorance tax allows for the possibility
that informed and uninformed agencies face different marginal record quality costs, all informed agencies
continue to have the same record quality costs regardless of what they learn about the true value of the
payoff. A possible extension of the model might allow quality costs to vary depending on the specific
content of the signal sent by the agency to the court. One possibility would be a model in which the agency
announces a specific observed value of the true payoff, and its record quality costs are a function of the
difference between the true observed payoff and the announced observed payoff. This sort of set-up starts
to approximate the situation in which the court can assess the content of an agency record on the merits.
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record quality. When signaling to the court that the agency is informed is either
unnecessary or insufficient for the court to uphold regulation, the fact that it is more
costly for uninformed agencies to produce record quality does not have any direct effect
on record quality. Therefore, while the ignorance tax is negatively correlated with
equilibrium record quality in some circumstances, the scope and magnitude of this effect
is bounded, and in many cases changes in the magnitude of the ignorance tax will have
no observable effect on record quality or on agency or court behavior.
III. OTHER APPLICATIONS
The costly signaling perspective is particularly well-suited to hard look judicial
review of agency regulations, but this dynamic may be at work in a variety of other
public law contexts in which the primary government decision-maker is, or may be,
better informed than the court about relevant aspects of the policy issue; the preferences
of the court and the government are divergent but correlated; and the government actor
that decides to implement a new policy can take some costly action that the court can
observe. Consider two other possible applications, at opposite ends of the public law
hierarchy: the Supreme Court’s review of congressional findings in constitutional
litigation, and a magistrate’s review of a police officer’s application for a search warrant.
A. Constitutional Law: State Interest and Congressional Jurisdiction

In certain areas of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
constitutionality of legislative action may depend in part on the quality of the legislative
record. Though these cases are still more the exception than the rule, and the Court
denies that anything like administrative law style hard look review is appropriate in
constitutional review of legislation, there are at least two contexts where the Supreme
Court appears to have hinted at this approach. First, there are a handful of opinions,
particularly in First Amendment cases, in which the Court has looked to the legislative
record in order to determine whether the government had demonstrated a sufficiently
strong state interest in enacting the challenged legislation. Second, the Court has
evaluated the quality of the legislative record in several cases raising the question
whether congressional legislation is authorized by Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In both these contexts, the Court’s inquiry into the quality of the legislative
record has been seen either as an illegitimate excuse for outcome-oriented decisionmaking or as a means by which the Court might acquire additional substantive
information to inform the Court’s independent judgment. The costly signaling theory
provides an alternative or supplementary perspective on these cases.
Suppose that Congress109 is (or may be) relatively better-informed about factual
questions that it deems relevant to the desirability of the legislation in question and that
the Court considers relevant to the legislation’s constitutionality. Congress, however,
cannot communicate this information verifiably to the Court. Suppose further that the
109
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preferences of the Court and Congress are positively correlated in expectation –
legislation that Congress prefers more strongly is, on average, more likely to be deemed
constitutional by the Court – but their preferences diverge: In some circumstances
Congress would like to pass legislation that the Court, if fully informed, would find
unconstitutional. Finally, suppose that the generation of a high quality legislative record
is costly to Congress and that the Court knows this. If these conditions hold, then the
quality of the legislative record may perform a signaling function in the constitutional
law context similar to the signaling function of the administrative record in the APA
context.
1. Strength of the state interest

In many cases, for example in much First Amendment litigation, the strength of the
government interest in challenged legislation is a constitutionally relevant issue, and
evaluating this interest entails a factual determination about the legislation’s likely
impact. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s successive decisions in litigation
over the “must carry” provisions of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act, which required cable television providers to devote a certain number of
their channels to local broadcast stations. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
(Turner I),110 the Court, applying an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny,
asked whether the must-carry provisions were narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest.111 Although a majority of the Court accepted the legitimacy of at
least some of the government’s proffered interests, which included preservation of
broadcast diversity and fair competition, the Court was more skeptical about the claimed
connection between the must-carry requirements and the achievement of these ends.
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion noted that Congress as an institution “is far better
equipped than the judiciary to ‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’ bearing
upon an issue as complex and dynamic” as this.112 But, although the plurality insisted
that “Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type
that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review,”113 the Court
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the government’s favor on the
grounds that the record before the Court (which did not include the full legislative record)
failed to establish that Congress could reasonably infer that the must-carry provisions
were narrowly tailored to advance legitimate government interests.114 When the issue
110

512 U.S. 622 (1994).
Id. at 661-62.
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Id. at 665-66 (quoting Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12
(1985)).
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Turner I, 512 U.S., at 666.
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record in the course of reaching its judgment.” Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
also observed that the record before the district court did not include the entire legislative record. Id.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, but thought that in light of the deference
due Congress’s predictive judgments, the Court should have affirmed. Id. at 669, 671-74 (Stevens, J.,
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reached the Court again in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II),115
however, the Court upheld the Act. This time, the Court had before it the full legislative
record, including hearing testimony and statements by Senators and representatives. This
record enabled the Court to conclude that there was indeed substantial evidence to
support Congress’s judgment that the must-carry provisions were related to an important
government interest.116 Though the dissent argued that the legislative record did not in
fact suffice to demonstrate the reasonability of Congress’s judgment,117 the majority
replied that the amount of detail demanded by the dissent was unwarranted.118
The Court’s emphasis on the adequacy of the legislative record in Turner I and
Turner II attracted scholarly attention.119 Despite the Court’s protestations to the
contrary, some suggested that the Court was treating Congress like an administrative
agency, applying a kind of hard look review to the legislative record.120 Furthermore, the
Court appeared to use something like this approach in other First Amendment cases,121
and there have been hints of something similar in other constitutional contexts where the
strength or legitimacy of the government’s interest is at issue.122 The conventional
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas
would have reversed on the grounds that the must-carry provisions were content-based. Id., at 674
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 512 U.S. at 685 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
115
520 U.S. 180 (1997).
116
Id. at 196-213. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court was joined in full by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Souter. Justice Breyer concurred in part, but he did not accept
promotion of “fair competition” as a constitutionally legitimate legislative objective. Id. at 226-27 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part).
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Turner II, 520 U.S., at 237-49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg
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Turner II, 520 U.S., at 213.
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campaign finance restriction at issue was adequately justified by the record); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 530-31 & n.17 (rejecting one of the Government’s proffered justifications for a statutory prohibition
on disclosing information obtained through an illegal wiretap, given that “there is no empirical evidence to
support the assumption that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the number of illegal interceptions”
and the “dearth of evidence in the legislative record to support [this] dry-up
- the-market theory”).
122
For example, in the controversial Takings Clause decision in Kelo v. City of New London, __ U.S.
__ (2005), Justice Stevens’ majority opinion emphasized the extensive record evidence supporting the City
of New London’s assertion that the taking at issue in that case would serve a public purpose, __ U.S., at __,
and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence stressed this point as well, __ U.S., at __ (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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understanding of the Court’s focus on the legislative record in these cases is that the
Court needs the legislature to provide enough information for the Court to evaluate the
merit, or at least the plausibility, of the government’s proffered justification.123 Another
more cynical view is that the Court uses the adequacy or inadequacy of the record as an
excuse to reach the result that the Court prefers on substantive grounds.124
The costly signaling theory provides another perspective on what the Court might
accomplish by adopting a highly deferential posture toward legislative predictions or
factual determinations only if they are supported by a sufficiently compelling legislative
record. To illustrate using the issue presented in the Turner cases, suppose that the Court
and Congress both dislike restrictions on speech (though perhaps for different reasons)
but believe that broadcast diversity is an important and legitimate government interest.
Suppose further, however, that the Court is relatively more concerned about speech and
less concerned about broadcast diversity. There is factual uncertainty about the impact of
the must-carry provisions on broadcast diversity, and Congress has better information
about this than the Court. Because it is costly for legislators to produce a record to
support the must-carry provisions – hearings, after all, take time that could be devoted to
constituency service, campaigning, or other legislative activity125 – the length and detail
of the legislative record may indicate to the Court something about how much Congress
cares about the must-carry provisions. This in turn conveys information to the Court
regarding the likely impact of the regulation on broadcast diversity. The Court might
therefore be willing to uphold a given statute only if it is accompanied by a sufficiently
impressive legislative record, even if the Court does not actually learn anything from the
record’s substantive content.
2. Legitimacy of prophylactic legislation

The Court has sometimes looked to the quantity and quality of congressional findings
in order to assess whether a statute falls within the scope of Congress’s enumerated
powers, particularly in cases addressing Congress’s power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As in the First Amendment cases, the Court generally denies
that the quality of the legislative record plays an important role in decisions regarding the
scope of Section Five.126 In City of Boerne v. Flores,127 which struck down the Religious
(observing that “[t]he city complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate review of the
record and inquiry into the city’s purposes”).
123
Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1740 (2002); Harold J. Krent,
Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 731, 736 (1996).
124
See Frickey & Smith, supra note 123, at 1736-37.
125
See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 119, at 384; Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 120-21 (2001); Krent, supra note 123, at 736.
126
For discussions of the Court’s use of legislative record review in Section Five cases, see Bryant &
Simeone, supra note 119, at 345-53; William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record
Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 111-18 (2001); Frickey & Smith, supra note 123, at 1722-24.
127
521 U.S. 507 (1997).

A SIGNALING THEORY OF HARD LOOK REVIEW

39

Freedom Restoration Act, the Court observed that the legislative record did not support
the government’s claim that the Act was necessary to prevent instances of
constitutionally prohibited government burdens on religion128 but insisted that the “lack
of support in the legislative record” was not dispositive and that judicial deference to
Congress is generally not “based on the state of the legislative record Congress
compiles….”129 In subsequent Section Five cases, however, the Court appeared to attach
substantial importance to the quality of the legislative record. In several cases involving
congressional attempts to invoke Section Five to abrogate state sovereign immunity, for
example, the Court has invalidated statutory provisions on the grounds that the legislative
record provided insufficient support for the claim that the challenged provision was
appropriately tailored to remedying or preventing constitutional violations. 130 The Court
has also relied heavily on the quality of the legislative record in post-Boerne decisions
upholding congressional statutes abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section
Five.131
128

Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
130
For example, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999), the Court held that the Patent Remedy Act’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity from
infringement suits was not valid under Section Five, and much of the Court’s reasoning focused on the
inadequacy of the legislative record. Though the Court insisted that “lack of support in the legislative
record is not determinative,” id. at 646, it emphasized that “identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or
evil is still a critical part of [the] §5 calculus,” id., and observed that in this case “the record offers at best
scant support for Congress’ conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without due
process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent actions,” id. In particular, the Court
observed that “Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the States,” id. at
640, and that “Congress … said nothing about the existence or adequacy of state remedies in the statute or
in the Senate Report, and made only a few fleeting references to State remedies in the House Report,” id. at
644. Another example is Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), in which the Court had to
decide whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was valid prophylactic legislation or an
illegitimate attempt to redefine the scope of the constitutional prohibition on age discrimination. The Court
declared that “[o]ne means by which we have made such a determination in the past is by examining the
legislative record,” id. at 88, and that in this case this legislative record “consists almost entirely of isolated
sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports,” id. at 89. The Court did, however, note that
lack of support in the legislative record “is not determinative,” id. at 91. A third Section Five/sovereign
immunity case in which the Court focused on alleged deficiencies in the legislative record is Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), a case involving the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court held that the ADA’s provision abrogating state sovereign immunity
was invalid because the “legislative record of the ADA … simply fails to show that Congress did in fact
identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.” Id. at 368.
Though Congress had made extensive findings with respect to employment discrimination against the
disabled, the Court found these findings too “general” to conclude that there was a pattern of discrimination
by states, id. at 369, and the Court also emphasized that, if Congress had understood the available evidence
as establishing a pattern of state employment discrimination against the disabled, “one would expect some
mention of that conclusion in the Act’s legislative findings. There is none.” Id. at 371.
131
For example, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), upheld a
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that abrogated state sovereign immunity as a valid
exercise of Congress’s power under Section Five to enforce the constitutional prohibition on gender
discrimination. The Court stressed that, “[a]ccording to evidence that was before Congress when it enacted
the FMLA, States continue to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in the employment context, specifically in
129
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Again, it is possible to explain the Court’s emphasis on the legislative record in terms
of the Court’s acquisition of information from Congress about constitutionally relevant
issues. This appears to be what the Boerne Court meant to suggest when it disclaimed
any notion that its decision was based on inadequacies in the legislative record. This
view was articulated even more clearly in the Commerce Clause cases United States v.
Lopez132 and United States v. Morrison,133 which emphasized that, “while Congress
normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an
activity has on interstate commerce, the existence of such findings may enable [a court]
to evaluate the legislative judgment that an activity … substantially affects interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect is visible to the naked eye.”134 It is
also possible, here as elsewhere, that the Court’s discussions of the legislative record are
merely a way for the Court to justify reaching a preferred outcome. While I do not
dispute the plausibility of either of these hypotheses, the costly signaling hypothesis
suggests another possibility. It may be that both the Court and Congress think that
prophylactic legislation pursuant to Section Five can be a good thing, but only if
constitutional violations absent the legislation would be sufficiently widespread.
Congress may have better information on this factual question than the Court, but the
Court might have a higher standard than Congress for how prevalent constitutional
violations must be in order for prophylactic legislation to be justifiable. If these
conditions hold, and if legislative record quality is costly to legislators, then the Court’s
evaluation of the legislative record may be explicable, at least in part, in terms of the
information it conveys about how serious Congress perceives the issue to be.135
B. Criminal Procedure: The Warrant Requirement

the administration of leave benefits,” id. at 730. The Court observed that the FMLA’s legislative record
included statistical evidence, testimony, and historical evidence of state practice, all of which supported the
claim that the FMLA was valid prophylactic legislation. Id., at 730-32. The Court similarly emphasized
the quality of the legislative record in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), which held that Title II of
the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in cases implicating the fundamental right of access to
the courts. The Court observed that the “sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of
unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of public services”
demonstrated the sufficiency of the record to support an exercise of Congress’s prophylactic Section Five
powers, id. at 528, and the Court noted further that “the record of constitutional violations in this case …
far exceeds the record in Hibbs,” id. at 529.
132
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
133
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
134
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). In the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), the court appeared to
believe that the validity of a congressional exercise of the Commerce Clause power would turn, at least as a
practical matter, on the existence of legislative findings that the activity regulated has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Id., at 1363-66. The Supreme Court’s decisions in both Lopez and Morrison both
appear to reject that notion, however.
135
Harold Krent has made the similar argument that legislative record review may “represent[] a
second-best solution to the problem of unconstrained legislative power” because the imposition of
“additional transaction costs may force Congress to be more cautious and deliberate in fashioning
legislation at the margins” of its constitutional authority. Krent, supra note 123, at 744.
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Though the costly signaling dynamic finds few obvious applications in criminal law,
there is at least one point in the criminal process where it may come into play: review by
magistrate judges of police applications for search warrants. Criminal law scholars have
noted that police applications for warrants are almost always approved,136 and that
searches pursuant to warrants have a very high success rate.137 One explanation for this
high success rate is that obtaining a warrant is costly to the police, and this cost acts as a
screening device that makes police unlikely to apply for warrants unless they anticipate
that the search is very likely to turn up valuable evidence. This may explain why
warranted searches are usually successful despite the fact that the magistrate review of
warrant applications so often appears cursory and deferential.138 Furthermore, the high
approval rate for warrant applications may also be explained, at least in part, by the cost
to police of seeking a warrant. The reviewing magistrate is generally less well-informed,
relative to the applicant police officer, as to whether the information proffered in the
warrant application is sufficient for the magistrate to consider a search justified. It may
also be the case that the preferences of the officer and the magistrate are positively
correlated – both want to catch criminals and avoid harassment of the innocent – but the
magistrate attaches greater relative weight to the latter goal than the officer does. If
applying for a warrant is costly to the police, and the magistrate knows this, then the fact
that the applicant officer went to the trouble of seeking the warrant enables the magistrate
to update her assessment of the probability that the search is justified from the
magistrate’s perspective, even if the magistrate learns nothing substantive from the
information in the warrant application.
One comparative prediction that arises from this conjecture is that if the cost to the
police of obtaining a warrant goes down – say, if the jurisdiction allows police to apply
for warrants over the telephone139 – then, all else equal, a magistrate’s propensity to grant
a police officer’s warrant application will go down. This implies that some warrant
applications that otherwise would have been granted will not be, though this will not
necessarily result in a lower application approval rate if the police anticipate the change
136

William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2183 & n. 142 (2002); Silas
J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J.
19, 34 & n. 63 (1988).
137
Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 925 (1986).
138
Id. at 926 & n.119.
Other scholars have discussed this argument, with varying degrees of
sympathy. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,
891-92 (1991) (noting the argument that the cost of warrants performs a screening function but also observing that this screening function could be more efficiently performed in other ways); David A. Sklansky,
Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1246-47 n.50 (observing that
the true value of warrants may lie in the fact that they impose costs on police applicants, but questioning
whether the current system imposes the “optimum level of hassle”). Both Stuntz and Sklansky seem to
accept Dripps’ positive claim that the high success rates of warranted searches may be explained by the fact
that the cost of warrants screens out searches with low expected value. Their objections concern whether
this screening could be achieved in some other, more socially desirable way (Stuntz’s objection), cf. supra.
Part I.D.3, and whether the cost of obtaining a warrant has been set at a socially optimal level (Sklansky’s
objections).
139
Telephonic warrants are constitutionally permissible. Though some jurisdictions have introduced
them, most have not. See Stuntz, supra note 138, at 892.
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in standards and do not apply in the marginal cases. Alternatively, magistrates may
respond by finding other ways to raise the costs of warrant applications, perhaps by
introducing more serious questioning of police and requiring more explanation of the
evidence supporting the application. If the latter approach is possible, it may end up
being more efficient, insofar as it is easier for police and reviewing magistrates to
calibrate the size of the signaling cost. The costly signaling perspective may therefore
supplement existing functional explanations of the warrant requirement and provide a
testable comparative hypothesis regarding the impact of lowering warrant application
costs via the introduction of telephonic warrants.140
CONCLUSION
Generalist judges with the responsibility to review decisions by other government
actors are handicapped by the fact that these other actors – be they agencies, legislatures,
or police officers – often have better access to decision-relevant information. The
judiciary’s institutional limitations make this asymmetric information problem difficult to
overcome. Even if judges demand and receive an explanation from the government agent
whose decision is under review, judges may be limited in their ability to interpret or
evaluate the information contained in such an explanation. But there may be other more
subtle and indirect ways for courts to mitigate this asymmetric information problem. The
fact that the government has chosen to act may itself be informative as to the
government’s information about the likely impact of its action. Reviewing courts can
also learn valuable information from the resources an expert government decision-maker
invests in explaining and defending its decision. The costly signaling theory of hard look
review posits that the government’s willingness to incur these additional costs allows the
court to draw more accurate inferences about what, if anything, the government has
learned about policy-relevant factual questions on which the court lacks information.
As a positive matter, the costly signaling theory provides an account of observed
patterns of judicial and government behavior and implies several additional hypotheses.
As a normative matter, what one thinks about the desirability of hard look review, if it
does function as a signaling device, depends in large part on what one thinks about
whether it is a good thing or a bad thing for policy to conform more closely to judicial
preferences. If one believes that judicial values are closer to social values or some other
normative benchmark, judicial use of record quality as a costly signal may be desirable.
Moreover, the costly signaling argument suggests a response to those who would critique
hard look review on the grounds that judges’ lack of expertise renders them incompetent
to review decisions by other government actors.141 If, on the other hand, one thinks that
140

Testing the latter hypothesis is complicated, however, by the fact that the decision whether to adopt
a telephonic warrant application process is endogenous, and unobserved jurisdiction-specific variables are
likely to influence both whether such a procedure is put in place and other aspects of the warrant
application process.
141
There are, or course, other critiques of judicial competence that do not depend on informational
asymmetries. For example, courts may suffer from cognitive or perceptual biases that lead to systematic
errors, even if judges have the “right” preferences and all relevant information. See Rachlinski & Farina,

A SIGNALING THEORY OF HARD LOOK REVIEW

43

judicial policy preferences should not constrain decisions by other government actors,
then one might take a more pessimistic view of devices like hard look review that judges
can use to induce other government actors to hew more closely to the judges’ values
under the guise of more innocuous-seeming demands that the government demonstrate
that its action is “reasonable” or “supportable.”
Another aspect of the normative assessment of the costly signaling account of hard
look review concerns the social costs associated with the resources the government sinks
into preparing a record. It may be that these costs, though significant to the government,
are socially unimportant. This might be the case if, for example, the resources the
government diverts to record preparation would otherwise have been spent on activities
that are trivial or wasteful from a social perspective, such as more leisure time or perks
for government bureaucrats. On the other hand, if the resources devoted to record
preparation are diverted from socially valuable activities – perhaps because these
resources would otherwise be devoted to different regulatory activities, or perhaps
because the necessary resources must be acquired through additional taxation – then the
social inefficiency associated with reliance on record quality as a costly signal may be
substantial.
In this Article, I do not take a position on these normative questions. My main
purpose here is not to argue that costly signaling through record quality is good or bad,
but rather to identify it as a plausible account for many of the behavior patterns
associated with hard look review. If the theory does capture some important positive
aspect of hard look review, then this may well have important implications for related
normative debates, but resolving these debates – and giving providing a bottom-line
assessment of whether hard look review as currently practiced is good or bad – would
require both a richer model that reintroduces complications this Article has deliberately
simplified away and a resolution of debates over values on which this Article offers no
special
Thisinsight.
Article has argued that we should not necessarily assume, when courts review
the explanations or justifications offered by government decision-makers, that the courts
are either learning valuable information from the content of the explanations or that the
exercise is a meaningless charade. While these are both possibilities, it is also possible
that the court, perhaps unconsciously, is learning from its evaluation of the quality of the
record something about how much the government cared about implementing this
particular decision, and this in turn signals something to the court about the government’s
decision-relevant information. Though this Article has focused on judicial review of
government decisions, the costly signaling dynamic may have applications to judicial
review in other contexts as well. For example, appellate review of lower court decisions
may sometimes involve evaluation of the effort that the lower court invested in defending
its findings. Similarly, judicial review of certain types of private decisions, for example
in corporate law and employment law, sometimes entails scrutiny of the reasons offered
for those decisions. It is possible that the costly signaling argument provides some
insight into the extent and nature of judicial review in these contexts as well. More
supra note 32, at 577-78; see also Cross, supra note 43
, at 1315 -22 (describing structural and doctrinal
biases of the litigation process). The thesis advanced in this Article does not engage such claims directly,
just as it does not engage claims of cognitive bias on the agency side. See, e.g., Rachlinski & Farina, supra
note 32, at 579-80; Seidenfeld, supra note 32.
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generally, the costly signaling function of hard look review may be an illustrative
example of how particular doctrines, practices, or behavior patterns serve functional ends
but do so in ways that differ in important respects from the ways in which those doctrines
and practices are conventionally understood and defended. This suggests a broader line
of research into indirect mechanisms of communication between legislatures, agencies,
courts, and other public or private parties.
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APPENDIX
A. Model Assumptions

Assume there is a decision-maker A (e.g., an agency) that can be one of two types,
{1,0}. With probability p [0,1] , = 1 (the agency is “informed”), and with
probability 1 p , = 0 (the agency is “uninformed”). Parameter p can be thought of as
a measure of the agency’s expertise. The agency must choose action z A {0,1}, e.g., to
maintain the status quo ( z A = 0 ) or to regulate ( z A = 1 ). If the agency chooses to
regulate, it sends pays unobservable cost x 0 , which generates a public signal (e.g., a
x
record of a particular quality), s =
. Parameter t 0 , which is common
1 + (1 )t
knowledge, captures the possibility that uninformed agencies may have higher marginal
signaling costs than informed agencies. If the agency regulates, a reviewer C (e.g., a
court) must choose action z C {0,1}, e.g., to strike down the regulation ( z C = 0 ) or to
uphold it ( z C = 1 ). The court knows p but does not observe whether the agency is
informed.
The final action is z = z A z C . If z = 0 , the agency and the court receive status quo
payoffs normalized to zero. If z = 1 , the agency receives payoff b (1 )k (b ) and the
court receives payoff b (1 )k (b ) j + . Parameter b, the “payoff” of regulation, is a
random variable with distribution F. If but only if the agency is informed, it observes b
before choosing whether to regulate. The court does not observe b, though it knows the
distribution F. Function k (b ) 0 , which is common knowledge, captures the fact that
uninformed agencies may regulate less efficiently than informed agencies. Define
parameter µ as the agency’s expected benefit from uninformed regulation (i.e.,
E (b k (b )) ). Parameter j captures the systematic preference divergence between the
agency and the court regarding the desirability of regulation: If j > 0 , the court is more
hostile to regulation than the agency; if j < 0 , the court is more sympathetic to regulation
is a random variable drawn from a distribution
than the agency. Finally, parameter
with mean 0. This parameter captures the possibility that the amount of preference
divergence between the court and the agency may have a random component – for
example, a particular regulation may have a higher than average benefit to the agency
that does not accrue to the court (low ) because this particular regulation will advance
goals that the agency views as important but the court views as irrelevant.
The agency’s final utility, given the above, is U A = z [b (1 )k (b ) s (1 + (1 )t )] .
The court’s final utility is U C = z [b (1 )k (b ) j + ] . To resolve ties, I assume that if
E (U A | z = 1) = E (U A | z = 0) = 0 , then the agency chooses z A = 0 , and if
E (U C | z = 1) = E (U C | z = 0) = 0 , the court chooses z C = 1 .

To sum up, the model consists of the following steps:
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Pr ( = 1) = p
, and chooses
Pr ( = 0) = 1 p

•

Step 1: Nature chooses

•
•
•
•
•

b from distribution F.
Step 2: A observes . If = 1 , A also observes b.
Step 3: A chooses z A = {0,1} . If z A = 0 the proceeds immediately to Step 7.
Step 4: A chooses x 0 .
Step 5: C observes s.
Step 6: C chooses z C = {0,1}

•

from distribution

Step 7: A receives utility U A = z [b (1 )k (b ) s (1 + (1
utility U C = z [b (1 )k (b ) j + ] .

)t )] , and C receives

B. Equilibrium Solution Concept
The preceding assumptions describe a signaling game in which the agency has private
information ( in all cases and b if = 1 ) and can send a costly signal, s, to the court.
The following analysis identifies pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this
game, subject to two equilibrium refinements.
First, I assume that if the court observes the agency make an out-of-equilibrium
choice (in particular, if the agency regulates and selects an s value for which the court’s
equilibrium strategy calls for it to strike down the regulation) then the court assumes that
the agency incorrectly believed the court would uphold the regulation, but that otherwise
the agency is rational.
Second, I assume that the PBE selected will be the PBE in which (1) the agency
either (a) chooses not to regulate or (b) chooses to regulate and selects the minimum s
necessary to induce the court to uphold regulation; and (2) the court chooses to uphold
regulation if but only if E (U C | s ) 0 . In other words, I focus on the equilibrium in
which the agency never sends a signal more costly than necessary for the court to infer
that the court’s expected utility from upholding regulation is non-negative, and the court
upholds regulation if but only if it expects this will give it non-negative utility. This is
the least-cost separating PBE (LCS-PBE), so called because it is the separating
equilibrium in which signal costs (x) are lowest.
C. Analysis
The LCS-PBE will be one of three possibilities, with the actual LCS-PBE dependent
on the values of the parameters. In one type of equilibrium, the agency will regulate even
if uninformed. Define s1* as the minimum s necessary for the court to uphold regulation
in the case where, by assumption, an uninformed agency would choose to regulate. The
condition that an uninformed agency would regulate, however, holds only if the signaling
cost for an uninformed agency, x = s1* (1 + t ) , is less than the expected benefit of
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uninformed regulation, µ . Therefore, the equilibrium signal sent by a regulating agency,

µ

denoted s * , will be s1* if but only if s1* <

. If this condition does not hold, then the
1+ t
LCS-PBE will be one of two other possibilities. Define s 2* as the minimum s necessary
for the court to uphold regulation if an uninformed agency would not regulate. Again,
the condition that an uninformed agency will not regulate is satisfied if but only if the

µ

equilibrium signal s *

1+ t

regulation if it chooses s =

. If s 2*

µ

µ

1+ t

, then the agency induce the court to uphold

, because by assumption a signal of this quality suffices
1+ t
to demonstrate that the agency is informed. In the case where an agency must
demonstrate that it is informed in order for the court to uphold regulation (i.e.,
s1*

µ

1+ t

), but a signal minimally sufficient to establish that the agency is informed is

enough for the court to uphold regulation (i.e., s 2*
sent by a regulating agency will be s * =

µ

µ
1+ t

µ
1+ t

), then the equilibrium signal

. If, on the other hand, a signal equal to

is insufficient for the court to uphold regulation (i.e., s 2* >

µ

), then the
1+ t
1+ t
equilibrium signal sent by a regulating agency will be s * = s 2* . The following proposition
demonstrates this result formally and characterizes s1* and s 2* .
Proposition 1: The three possible LCS-PBEs of the game, and the mutually exclusive
conditions that sustain each of them, are as follows:
(a) Define s1* as the minimum s that solves
s1* <

µ

p(1 F (s ))E (b | b > s ) + (1 p )µ
1 pF (s )

j . If

, then the following strategy profiles comprise the LCS-PBE:
1+ t
o A: Choose z A = 1 and s = s1* if = 0 or if = 1 and b > s1* (note that if
= 1 the explanation cost to A is s1* and if

(1 + t )s

= 0 the explanation cost is

); choose z A = 0 otherwise;
o C: Choose z C = 1 if s s1* ; choose z C = 0 otherwise.
*
1

(b) Define s 2* is the minimum s that solves E (b | b > s ) = j .
s 2*

µ
1+ t

If s1* >

, then the following strategy profiles comprise the LCS-PBE:

µ
1+ t

and
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o A: Choose z A = 1 and s = s 2* if
= 1 and b > s 2* ; choose z A = 0
otherwise;
o C: Choose z C = 1 if s s 2* ; choose z C = 0 otherwise.

(c) If s1* >

µ

1+ t
LCS-PBE:

and s 2* <

µ
1+ t

, then the following strategy profiles comprise the

o A: Choose z A = 1 and s =

otherwise;
o C: Choose z C = 1 if s

µ
1+ t

µ
1+ t

if

= 1 and b >

µ
1+ t

; choose z A = 0

; choose z C = 0 otherwise.

Proof:
(a) The strategy profiles described in Proposition 1(a) comprise the LCS-PBE given
the specified conditions:
•

Define q as C’s posterior estimate of the probability that Pr ( = 1 | z A = 1) .
E (U C | z = 1) = qE (b | = 1, z A = 1) + (1 q )µ j .
By
Bayes’
Rule,
q=

Pr ( z A = 1 |

Pr ( z A = 1 | = 1) Pr ( = 1)
. By definition, Pr ( = 1) = p
= 1) Pr ( = 1) + Pr ( z A = 1 | = 0 ) Pr ( = 0 )

and Pr ( = 0) = 1 p . Given A’s equilibrium strategy, C can assume that
Pr ( z A = 1 | = 1) = Pr (b > s1* ) = 1 F (s1* )
and
that
Pr ( z A = 1 | = 0) = 1 .
*
*
p(1 F ( x ))
, so E (U C | z = 1) = p (1 F (s1 ))E (b | b > *s1 ) + (1 p )µ j .
Therefore, q =
1 pF (x )
1 pF (s1 )
*
*
This is non-negative if, but only if, p(1 F (s1 ))E (b | b > s1 ) + (1 p )µ
. C

( )

1 pF s1*

•

j

therefore has no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy.
If = 0 , then if A selects z A = 1 and x = (1 + t )s1* (resulting in signal s = s1* ), C
will select z C = 1 , and A’s expected utility will be µ (1 + t )s1* > 0 . If, given that
= 0 , A were to select a higher x, (1 + t )s1* + , A’s expected utility would be

µ

(1 + t )s1*

(1 + t )s1* . If A
(1 + t )s1*
be s =

<µ

signal sent would

, the

< s1* , so C would select z C = 0 and A’s

1+ t
utility would be (1 + t )s + < 0 . Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate from
its equilibrium strategy when = 0 .
If = 1 , then if A observes b > s1* and chooses z A = 1 and s = s1* , A’s expected
utility is b s1* > 0 . For reasons parallel to those given above, A cannot improve
*
1

•

were to select a lower x, (1 + t )s1*
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•

its payoff by choosing an s greater or less than s1* . Therefore, A has no incentive
to deviate from its equilibrium strategy when = 1 and b > s1* .
If = 1 and A observes b s1* , then A’s net payoff cannot exceed 0. If A selects
z A = 1 and s < s1* , C will choose z C = 0 , giving A a final utility of s . If A
selects z A = 1 and s

•
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s1* , C will choose z C = 1 , giving A a final utility of

b s1* 0 . Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy
when = 1 and b < s1* .
The above is sufficient to demonstrate not only that this PBE exists under the
specified conditions, but that if it exists it is the LCS-PBE. Any similar candidate
PBE in which the threshold value s * < s1* does not achieve separation, because it
is irrational in such a case for C to choose z C = 1 for any s < s1* . Any candidate
equilibrium in which C chooses z C = 1 only if it observes a signal s * > s1* by
definition entails a higher signal cost than the equilibrium in which C chooses
z C = 1 if it observes a signal s s1* , and so cannot be the LCS- PBE.

(b) The equilibrium described in Proposition 1(b) is the LCS-PBE given the specified
conditions:

•

•

•

•

Given A’s equilibrium strategy, C’s posterior probability estimate
Pr ( = 1 | z A = 1) = 1 . Therefore, E (U C | z = 1) = E (b | b > s 2* ) j , which is non-

negative if but only if E (b | b > s 2* ) > j . C therefore has no incentive to deviate
from its equilibrium strategy.
If = 0 , then if A chooses z A = 1 and any x < (1 + t )s 2* , C will observe s < s 2*
and will select z C = 0 . A’s expected payoff will therefore be x 0 . If A

chooses z A = 1 and any x (1 + t )s 2* , C will observe s s 2* and will select
z C = 1 . This gives A expected payoff µ (1 + t )s 2* 0 . Therefore, A has no
incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy when = 0 .
If = 1 and A observes b s 2* , A’s utility from choosing z A = 1 is x 0 if
x < s 2* and is b x 0 if x s 2* . Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate from
its equilibrium strategy when = 1 and b s 2* .
If = 1 and A observes b > s 2* , then A’s payoff if it chooses s = s 2* is b s 2* > 0 .
, then in equilibrium C will choose z C = 0 , giving A
If A chooses a lower s, s 2*
utility

s 2* +

b s 2* . If A chooses a higher s, s 2* + , C will choose z C = 1 and

A’s payoff will be b s 2*
< b s 2* . Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate
from its equilibrium strategy when = 1 and b > s 2* .
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The condition that s1* >
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µ

means there is no PBE in which C will choose
1+ t
z C = 1 if its posterior estimate of Pr ( = 1) < 1 . Therefore, in order for a PBE to

µ

exist when s1* >

, two requirements must be satisfied. First, it must be the
1+ t
case that C’s posterior estimate Pr ( = 1 | z A = 1) = 1 . The minimum s that

µ

, because this s value implies an x
1+ t
sufficiently large to eliminate any positive expected value an uniformed A might
otherwise obtain from z = 1 . Second, it must be the case that C’s posterior
expected value E (b | z A = 1) j . The minimum s that satisfies this condition is
s 2* by definition. Because both of these conditions must be satisfied for the
candidate PBE to exist, only one of them will bind (except where
satisfies this requirement is max 0,

s 2* = max 0,

µ

), and the binding condition determines which PBE is LCS.

1+ t

µ

When s 2* >

, only the second condition binds. Therefore, the PBE described
1+ t
in Proposition 1(b) is the LCS-PBE given the conditions specified.
(c) The equilibrium described in Proposition 1(c) is the LCS-PBE given the specified
conditions:

•

Because of A’s equilibrium strategy, C can infer that, if z A = 1 and s
= 1 and b >
E b|b >

µ

µ
1+ t

strategy if s

•

If

1+ t
j.

1+ t

condition that
E b|b >

µ

µ
1+ t

µ
1+ t

, then

. Therefore, C’s expected payoff from choosing z C = 1 is
Given (a) that by definition E (b | b > s 2* )
> s 2* ; and (c) the fact that

dE (b | b > s )
ds

j ; (b) the

0 , it follows that

> j . Therefore, C has no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium

µ
1+ t

.

= 0 , then if A chooses z A = 1 and any x < µ , C will observe s <

will select z C = 0 . A’s expected payoff will therefore be

z A = 1 and any x

µ , C will observe s

µ
1+ t

x

µ

and
1+ t
0 . If A chooses

and will select z C = 1 .

This
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gives A an expected payoff no greater than 0. Therefore, A has no incentive to
deviate from its equilibrium strategy when = 0 .

•

If
x<

= 1 and A observes b

µ
1+ t

µ

1+ t

0 if x >

and is b x

, A’s utility from choosing z A = 1 is

µ

1+ t

from its equilibrium strategy when

•

If

= 1 and b >

and s =

µ

µ
1+ t

x

0 if

. Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate

µ

= 1 and b

1+ t

.

, A’s payoff from choosing its equilibrium strategy, z A = 1

µ

> 0 . If A were to choose a higher s, C will still choose
1+ t
1+ t
z C = 1 but A’s payoff will be lower; if A were to choose a lower s, C would

, is b

choose z C = 0 and A’s payoff would be no greater than 0. A therefore has no
incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy when

•

= 1 and b >

µ

.
1+ t
The difference between this case and that described in Proposition 1(b) is that in
this case the binding condition is the requirement that C must be able to infer with
= 1 . The minimum s which satisfies this condition is
probability 1 that
s=

µ

. Because of the condition that s 2* <

µ

, s=

µ

is also sufficient to
1+ t
1+ t
1+ t
guarantee C a nonnegative expected utility if A chooses z A = 1 . Therefore, this
equilibrium is the LCS-PBE under the specified conditions.

D. Comparative Statics
Recall that s *

s1* , s 2* ,

µ

is the signal the agency sends in equilibrium when it
1+ t
chooses to regulate. We would like to know how s * varies as the other parameters (j, p,
t, and µ ) change. Before considering each of these four relationships, it is useful to
establish the following two lemmas.

Lemma 1: If s * = s1* > 0 , then j > s1* .
Proof: Suppose s1* = sˆ > j . It follows immediately from this that E (b | b > sˆ ) > j . The

µ

sˆ < µ . This, coupled with the
1+ t
assumption that sˆ > j , implies that µ > j . The fact that sˆ = s1* > 0 implies that
p(1 F (sˆ ))E (b | b > sˆ ) + (1 p )µ = j (1 pF (sˆ )) , which can be rewritten as

fact that s * = s1* > 0 implies that s1* = sˆ <
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p(1 F (sˆ ))(E (b | b > sˆ ) j ) = (1 p )( j µ ) . The right-hand side of this equality must
be negative, but the left-hand side must be non-negative. Therefore, we have a
contradiction.
Lemma 2: If µ

j , then s * = 0 .

Proof: If A selects z A = 1 and s * = 0 , C’s expected payoff from selecting z C = 1 is
Pr ( = 0 | s * = 0)µ + Pr ( = 1 | s * = 0)E (b | b > 0) j .
Because
E (b | b > 0) E (b ) = µ , E (b | b > 0) can be rewritten as µ + ! , where ! 0 . C’s
expected payoff from selecting z C = 1 when A selects z A = 1 and s * = 0 can

therefore be rewritten as µ j + Pr ( = 1 | s * = 0)! , which is always non-negative if
µ j . From this it follows that, if µ j , then C chooses z C = 1 if s * = 0 . A,
therefore, has no incentive to select any s * > 0 , as doing so reduces A’s utility
without affecting C’s behavior.

Remark 1: The j parameter is positively correlated with s * over a range of parameter
values; outside that range, j is uncorrelated with s * . First, using the implicit function
theorem and Lemma 1, we know that if n1

*
( *)
0 , "s1 = 1 *pF s1 *

"j

( )(

pf s1 j

s1

)

0 . This implies

that, over the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium signal is
s * = s1* > 0 , increases in j increase s1* . Consequently the range of parameter values
for which s * = s1* decreases because, for some parameter values, the increase in j will
raise s1* above the threshold value
theorem

and

the

1 F (s )
"s
=
"j
f (s 2* )( j s 2* )
*
2

*
2

fact

µ

. Second, invoking the implicit function
1+ t
E b | b > s 2* = j
s 2* j , we know that

(

that

)

0 . Therefore, increases in j increase the value of s 2* in the

range where s * = s 2* . For this reason, increases in j also increase the range of
parameter values for which s * is s 2* rather than

µ

1+ t

. If s * =

µ

1+ t

, changes in j have

no effect on s * .

Remark 2: Over the range of parameter values for which s * = s1* > 0 , p is negatively
By the implicit function theorem we know that
correlated with s * .
"s1*
=
"p

µ

$

( ) # yf ( y )dy
µ
=
pf (s )( j s )

jF s1*

s1*

*
1

*
1

( ) E (b | b > s )(1 F (s )) < 0 .
pf (s )( j s )

jF s1*

*
1

*
1
*
1

*
1

This is easier to see
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*
*
if we rewrite the expression as "s1 = F (s1 )(µ

"p

j)

(1
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( ))( (
( )( )

F s1* E b | b > s1*
pf s1* j s1*

) µ).

The

denominator is positive (Lemma 1). The numerator is negative in light of the fact that
for all s1* > 0 it must be the case that j > µ (Lemma 2) and that, by definition,

E (b | b > s1* ) E (b ) = µ . If s * = max s 2* ,

Remark 3: Increases in t decrease

µ
1+ t

, then p is uncorrelated with s * .

µ

, the threshold signal value above which C can
1+ t
= 1 if z A = 1 . This has the effects of (a) reducing the

infer with probability 1 that
range of parameter values for which s * = s1* ; (b) increasing the range of parameter
values for which s * = s 2* ; and (c) decreasing s * when s * =

µ

. The t parameter
1+ t
therefore is either a negatively correlated or uncorrelated with s * . As long as

µ

> s 2* (that is, as long as a signal sufficient to guarantee that

1+ t
sufficient to guarantee that E (b | z A = 1)

to a floor equal to s 2* . As soon as

µ

1+ t

= 1 is also

j ) then increases in t decrease s * , but only
s 2* , further increases in t have no effect.

"s1*
p 1
Remark 4: If s = s > 0 , then
=
< 0 . Thus, as µ increases, s1*
*
*
"µ
pf (s1 )( j s1 )
decreases (to a minimum of 0). Also, as µ increases, the range of parameter values
for which s * = s1* increases. This occurs not only because increases in µ decrease
*

*
1

s1* , but also because they increase the threshold value
in µ increase s * if

µ

µ
1+ t

µ

1+ t

. If s1* >

µ

1+ t

, increases

> s 2* , which also increases the range of parameter values for

So, µ may be positively correlated, negatively correlated, or
1+ t
uncorrelated with s * . When µ is sufficiently low, s * = s 2* , which is unaffected by

which

> s 2* .

µ . If µ increases to the point where s1* >
increase s * =

µ

µ

1+ t

> s 2* , then further increases in µ will

. But as soon as µ increases to the point where

µ

> s1* , then
+
1 t
1+ t
further increases in µ will decrease s * = s1* . (If s1* < s 2* , then there is no range over
which increases in µ increase equilibrium explanation costs.)

